1076

1967

VOL VI

(26 JUNE – 30 JUNE)

File No. 1076

FO 174/401

Name of File—

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES

NO MINUTES TO BE WRITTEN HERE

RECORD OF WEEDING		
	INITIALS	DATE
2 YEARS		11/11/71
5 YEARS (CONSULAR POSTS ONLY)		
10 YEARS		

CLOSED WITH 2001

LAST Year's File No. 1076/66

NEXT Year's File No.

1076

(1883) D. 156230 177M 10/65 P.I. Gp. 610

1967

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1076

BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL
CASABLANCA

50/0/67

26 June 1967

Dear Fab,

I do not know whether amongst the papers read in the Embassy you include El Assas. This is a weekly started about three months ago, but until the start of the crisis it appeared irregularly. It is published by Mohammed Hijji Lammouri, President of the Prefectoral Assembly and Secretary General of the Casablanca Municipal Council and is said to be backed by Boutaleb who, as you know, is also President of the Municipal Council. I am told it has been taking a particularly vicous anti-British, anti-American and anti-Jewish line, calling amongst other things for the taking over of all Jewish schools as well as the enforcement of the anti-Jewish boycott.

2. Another paper which I am told is worth studying is Jeha, a satirical weekly edited by El. Kebri and Said Seddiki, both formerly of the Jeunesse UMT. It is strongly xenophobic, and not only anti-British, anti-American and anti-Jewish, but also anti-French and anti-Russian.

EL KEBRI

Yours ever

(Patrick Johnston)

F. Ward, Esq.,
British Embassy,
Rabat.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
27 JUN 1967

RESTRICTED

We do not actually see OS either of these, but the US weekly press summary deals with them.

ACS 1.VII

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Otter & Gowlett

I want to be sure that this letter is dead accurate so please study <u>each</u> statement and argument with care and let me know if you find any of them inaccurate or misleading.

DO:
O.S. minute AUS 27.VI
D.A.M. 28/6.
N.H.C. 26/VI

<u>Wilson / Johnson meeting</u>: In the interests of accuracy, this meeting was planned <u>before</u> the Middle East flare-up to discuss, inter alia, the Common Market and Vietnam (?)
Because of the flare-up Mr. Wilson's visit to Canada and U.S. had to be curtailed and of course the Middle East was added to the agenda as No. 1 item (and probably sole item.) in the Wilson/Johnson talks.

27 June 1967

M.F.P

Minutes.

Although King Hussein was reported at one stage as having said that he did not believe the accusations against us, I think this was incorrect: at any event, his most recent statement on the subject of Anglo-American support for Israel are to the effect that there is no conclusive proof either way but that Jordan was attacked by a far larger number of aircraft than they had expected. He said that the question was still open as far as he was concerned, but that he had taken account of the denials from Washington and London and was prepared to give us the benefit of the doubt.

Better omit

A.L. Southern 27-VI

26/VI

Draft to issue.

ALS 29-VI

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1076

Minutes.

Guidance 158

I am not aware of any publicity having been given to Israel's Attorneys' press conference in distorted form or otherwise by HMG or the press; & I suggest we ~~do~~ do not use this ~~except~~ except in rebuttal if need arise.

2. Thanks to King Hussein, even the opposition press this morning are helping to give currency to the idea that Britain + the U.S. did not help Israel.

Abumansman.

26 June 1967

H.E.

26/VI

M.F.P

British Information Services

Communiqué de Presse

076

Le 26 juin 1967

Vol. No. Date

Table des Matières

MOYEN -ORIENT: PRINCIPES BRITANNIQUES POUR UN REGLEMENT

S'adressant à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies le 21 juin, le Secrétaire britannique aux Affaires Etrangères M. George Brown, a déclaré:

"Je voudrais, si vous le permettez, exposer certains principes qui, à mon avis, devraient nous guider dans notre recherche collective pour un règlement.

Il est évident que ces principes doivent dériver de la Charte des Nations Unies. L'Article 2 de la Charte prévoit que "tous les membres devront s'abstenir dans leurs relations internationales de menacer ou de faire usage de la force contre l'intégrité territoriale ou l'indépendance politique de tout Etat". Ici, les mots "intégrité territoriale" ont un impact direct sur la question de retrait dont on a beaucoup parlé au cours des derniers discours. Je ne vois pas deux mesures à ce sujet, et j'expose notre position clairement. A mon avis, de par les mots de la Charte, la guerre ne devrait pas mener à un agrandissement territorial.

Des rapports suggèrent que ce point particulier présente une urgence spéciale, concernant Jérusalem. Je fais appel à l'Etat d'Israel pour ne pas prendre de mesure se rapportant à Jérusalem qui soit en désaccord avec ce principe. Je le dis solennellement au Gouvernement d'Israel, s'il a la prétention d'annexer la vieille ville de Jérusalem ou légiférer pour son annexion, il prendra alors une mesure qui ne l'isolera pas seulement de l'opinion mondiale, mais lui fera perdre toute sympathie qu'on lui porte.

Ayant clairement exposé ma position à ce sujet, j'en viens à reconnaître que les Arabes et Israel ont des problèmes à poser qu'ils ont le droit de demander à faire entendre et

à faire traîter avec respect. Et nous, au sein de la communauté internationale, avons des intérêts légitimes qui doivent être respectés.

Quels sont ces problèmes ? Tout d'abord les intérêts et le bien-être des réfugiés. Ce très grave problème se pose à nous depuis longtemps, et est plus difficile depuis ce qui est arrivé ces dernieres semaines. Nous avons tellement échoué dans ce problème dans le passé que nous ne pouvons continuer ~~de~~ à vivre avec ce problème plus longtemps. J'aurai encore quelque chose à dire à ce sujet dans un instant.

Deuxièmement, tout règlement doit reconnaître le droit d'exister à tous les Etats de la région, dans la vraie dignité et la liberté, ce qui doit comprendre la possibilité de gagner leur vie dans une paix assurée. C'est là, à ce que j'ai compris, l'opinion de M. Kassyguine, et j'espère que je ne me suis pas trompé.

En troisième lieu, le droit de libre passgae doit être respécté dans toutes les voies d'eau internationales pour les navires de toutes les nations. C'est là aussi le problème pratique immédiat du nettoyage du Canal de Suez. Dès que cela sera fait, cette grande voie d'eau internationale devra être réouverte dès que possible. C'est un problème d'importance vitale pour beacoup de pays représentés dans cette Assemblée.

Quatrièmement, et c'est là un point critique - Si les pays du Moyen-Orient veulent vivre en paix et développer leurs ressources, ils doivent être libérés des pressions qui les ont menés à gaspiller leurs ressources dans la course aux armements. Evidemment, aucun gouvernement ne peut résister à ces pressions si ses voisins n'en font pas autant. Le problème impose des responsabilités non seulement aux gouvernements de cette région, mais aussi aux puissances qui fournissent actuellement des armes. Ces dernières, nous compris, devraient arriver à un accord dès que possible. Déjà de nouveaux pays fournissent des armes au Proche-Orient. Il est impératif de conclure un accord sur la limitation des armes dès que possible.

E to F
G to H

1076

Communiqué de Presse

Le 26 juin 1967.
Date

Vol. No.

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LES DONS BRITANNIQUES AUX REFUGIES ARABES AFFLUENT

Les dons pour les réfugiés Arabes affluent de toutes les parties de la Grande-Bretagne en réponse à un appel à la télévision de la BBC. En trois jours, les contributions avaient déjà atteint £30.500 (soit environ 430.000 dh).

Les sommes recueillies seront administrées par le Comité de la Croix Rouge internationale et la Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix Rouge.

Un porte-parole du siège de la Croix Rouge a déclaré aujourd'hui: "Ce chiffre n'est aucunement un total définitif. Nous n'avons pas encore compté deux journées de courrier, et les dons continuent d'affluer".

Un autre appel sera fait ce soir sur les réseaux de la télévision indépendante dans tout le pays.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Minutes.

1076

British Contributions for Refugees

When I took our latest release along to Mr. Bamech in MAP he welcomed the new line & accepted the release for immediate publication.

2. When he said they had had more than enough of our démentis I told him that we had now laid off!

A Rumbold.

26 June 1967

HE

X f 27/6

27/VI

M.F.P

1076

Attitudes and actions of the Moroccan trade union movement during the Middle East crisis. Period 26 May - 23 June 1967

The first signs of trade union reaction to the events in the Middle East came during the week prior to the outbreak of the Israeli-Egyptian war. 'Al Alam', the Istiqlal Party's Arabic newspaper, reported a meeting of the Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc (UGTM) held on Friday 26 May, at which the Union announced its support of Egypt's policies and urged that Israel should be destroyed. The UGTM also pressed that Morocco should help the Arab cause with men and arms, and claimed that dockers were prepared to boycott ships of colonial states helping Israel.

2. The Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) was unable to give wide publicity to its own policy because the edition of 27 May 1967 of its weekly newspaper 'L'Avant Garde' was seized. It is possible that the paper contained two items offensive to the authorities, one disclosing the arrest of some 200 miners on 24 May, and the other may have been a reprint of a statement issued by the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) on the subject of the Middle East crisis, which was both inflammatory and revolutionary in tone. UMT's Headquarters issued a communiqué on 26 May, appealing to the working classes to boycott colonial states supporting Israel, and to refuse to handle their ships in Moroccan ports, thus demonstrating their support of Palestinians and giving effect to Arab solidarity. This was followed up by a meeting of the UMT National Executive, which, in another communiqué on 29 May, approved the HQ statement, and reaffirmed the willingness of Moroccan workers to defy Zionists and imperialists.

3. On 5 June, the day hostilities broke out, UMT supporters demonstrated in Rabat - although the demonstrations were quickly controlled and dispersed peacefully. A report in 'Maghreb Informations' that 5000 workers demonstrated outside the US Embassy was quite exaggerated, and other claims of meetings organised throughout the country by the UMT, appear not to have resulted in any violent manifestations. The "party line" had been developed, however, and in denouncing Israeli aggression, both

/..Britain

Britain and America came in for attacks such as "The puppet state of Israel was a bridge for Anglo-American imperialism to the heart of the Arab world, and, like a cancer, would have to be cut out". At Casablanca, on 6 June, a public meeting was organised by the Casablanca "Union locale" of the UMT, at which Mahjoub ben Seddik, Secretary-General of UMT, made a speech which has been interpreted as an effort at moderation and to retain control of the workers. Abdullah Ibrahim, a former Prime Minister and friend of the UMT's leadership, also spoke at the meeting, giving an historical background to the Middle East situation. His words were moderate and he asked why, if the Jews were the victims of the Nazis, should the Arabs pay for it ? The boycott of ships was made effective, however, although ironically one of the first which dockers refused to unload was an American vessel containing a gift of wheat. In an effort to influence this UMT decision, a personal telegram was sent to the Secretary-General, conveying the British Government's denials of the charges falsely made by Egypt of our collusion with Israel, and in particular the allegations of giving air support. While there was some delay in dealing with British and American shipping, and some interference with aircraft flights, normal working was resumed in a few days. It was known that the authorities were against the union's action and were prepared to use force, the consequences of which would undoubtedly have been serious.

4. The UGTM issued another communiqué on 8 June, requesting the Moroccan Government to take a clear attitude against Anglo-American aggression and break off diplomatic relations. The UGTM followed the Istiqlal party line, which progressively became more excitable and revolutionary in tone, through its newspapers 'Al Alam' and 'L'Opinion' which, in turn, were suppressed by the Government for two days. 'Al Alam' reported on 10 June that arrangements for a general strike had been made in Fès (presumably by the UGTM), but that the Governor had banned it; it is understood that a number of shops remained closed as a public gesture. 'L'Avant Garde' reappeared on 17 June, after three weeks' absence. The full text of the communiqué issued after the extraordinary meeting of the UMT's National Council on 29 May was printed in this number, and it is of interest to note that on that occasion (before the outbreak of hostilities), the main concern was with

/..internal

internal affairs. The communiqué protested vigorously against "the campaign of provocation and repression lead by the authorities against the working class". This had been provoked by the use of armed forces against the miners at Aouli. An important and unusual contribution to this edition of 'L'Avant Garde' was made by M. Oumeziane, Secretary-General of the Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) who wrote about the zionist aggression, on the duty of the Arab nations and the solidarity of African workers. The theme of the article was an attack on "colonialism" and "imperialism", lead by America, which must be neutralised. Algeria intended to deprive "imperialism" of resources in our country and to liquidate its economic empire, nationalise British and American firms, close Algerian markets to the products of imperialist countries, and stop supplying them with oil etc. They would also free themselves from the technical and financial tutelage of American and British neo-colonialism. Algerian workers knew the price they must pay and are ready to sacrifice. The UGTA is in full agreement with the Algerian Government's policy. The publication of this article by the UMT seems to be a way of expressing their own dissatisfaction at the Moroccan Government's lack of action, and contrasts with the vigorous protest published only the previous week in the 'official' Government press against the Algerian radio's call to Moroccan workers to "take matters into their own hands".

5. This article appears to be a record of a speech made by Oumeziane on the occasion of a meeting of the Executive of the All African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) which met in Casablanca on 16 June. The names of the representatives to this meeting have not been revealed, but a report published in 'L'Avant Garde' states that AATUF considers that the aggression carried out by Israel, USA and Great Britain, is in fact directed against all the people of the Third World, with the object of racial domination and colonial exploitation. It condemns the wave of racialism coming from Western Europe and USA; denounces their hypocrisy by enriching themselves by colonial pillage and always refusing aid to the Third World. France comes in, for once, for adverse comment when it is said that in six months, 130 millions (of francs) were raised for the people of Vietnam, while in three days 11 milliards were collected for Israel. The struggle of the Arabs against Zionism and imperialism is of direct interest to countries of the Third World and socilist countries. African workers are asked to organise a campaign to make known the common character of the Arab struggle, to denounce the racial character of Israel, to denounce the imperialism of USA and Britain and all States that support Israel, to combat Israel's

Israel's infiltration in Africa, to take initiative to hold meetings, manifestations of protestation, collections etc. AATUF would work in accord with Arab trade unions, and those of socialist countries, both nationally and internationally. All Africans are asked to respond to the appeal to stand against Zionists and imperialists.

6. A meeting of trade union leaders held in Casablanca on 25 June, called for the expulsion of all Zionists from public and semi-public organisations, accusing in general both foreign and Moroccan Jews holding important posts, of exploiting their positions to serve the "enemy". The UMT in its edition of 'L'Avant Garde' of 17 June commenced an anti-Zionist campaign which was followed up more violently the next week to the extent of identifying some firms which are Jewish owned or directed. Resolutions calling for a purge of all Zionists from their organisations were passed at meetings of employees of the "Office de Commercialisation et d'Exportation", and post office workers. This campaign also appears to be part of the pressure being put on the Government by the trade union movement.

A.C. WELLS
First Secretary
(Labour)

26 June 1967.

Distribution: J. Oates, Esq., Ministry of Labour (5 copies)
North and East African Dept, Foreign Office (2)
G. Foggon Esq., CMG, OBE, Foreign Office
British Interests Section, Swiss Embassy, Algiers

UNCLASSIFIED

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

26 June, 1967.

In its leading article on 19 June, the Istiqlali mouthpiece Al Alam produced an interesting argument, based on the Egyptian lie of Anglo-American participation in the recent war in the Middle East, calling for the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of the British and American fleets.

2. Arguing from the premise that Israel is an artificial creation of colonialism, and that colonialism keeps its hold by the maintenance of its fleets cruising the seven seas (replacing the naval and other military bases overseas, from most of which it has now been expelled,) the editorial concludes that their presence is a constant menace to security. "Consequently the states of the Mediterranean basin have a perfect right to get together with the purpose of deciding to demand through the competent international organisms, the withdrawal of the U.S. 6th Fleet and of the British fleet which are permanently stationed in the Mediterranean". They should be granted only the international right of passage possessed by all states.....We therefore invite the populations of the southern Mediterranean basin to adopt this idea of evacuating this international tutelage and to invite the populations of the northern basin to join them in casting off together this veritable naval occupation which is imposed on us all".

3. If this had been done in the past, the people of Palestine would have been spared Israeli occupation and the Arab people would not have to face the spectre of periodic war arising from the support given to Israel by foreign fleets and carrier-based aircraft.

(A. L. Southorn)

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

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PRODROME RABAT

VERBATIM SERVICE 299 26TH JUNE 1967

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM SUPPLEMENTARIES TO STATEMENT BY FOREIGN SECRETARY IN HOUSE OF COMMONS, TODAY (JUNE 26, 1967) ON HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK:-

(MR. HEATH SPEAKING)

MR. HEATH: WE ARE GRATEFUL TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY FOR MAKING THIS STATEMENT. I HOPE HE REALISES THAT THE REASON FOR WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE MIXED RECEPTION TO HIS SPEECH HERE IS THAT BY HIS EMPHASIS OF THE NON-AGGRANDISEMENT FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY IN THAT PARTICULAR PART OF HIS SPEECH BY HIS REFERENCE TO JERUSALEM, HE APPEARED TO BE DOING EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO DO, WHICH WAS TO FORECAST WHAT THE EVENTUAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE GOING TO BE. THIS, IN FACT APPEARED TO BE A RETURN TO THE EXACT STATUS QUO FROM WHICH THE TROUBLE HAD ORIGINALLY SPRUNG.

MAY I THEREFORE PUT TO HIM THIS QUESTION? IS IT HIS VIEW THAT THE FINAL FRONTIERS REMAIN TO BE SETTLED AS ONE PART OF THE TOTAL FINAL PACKAGE ARRANGEMENT?.....

MR. BROWN... WHEN WE COME TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, THE RIGHT OF THE STATES TO LIVE IN TRUE DIGNITY, IN FREEDOM, TO BE ABLE EARN THEIR LIVING IN PEACE - THAT IS WHAT I SAID IN NEW YORK: THAT IS WHAT I BELIEVE - THAT WILL HAVE TO BE BALANCED AGAINST SOME OTHER DEMANDS THAT WILL BE MADE. I DO NOT THINK THIS IS THE MOMENT TO PRE-JUDGE ALL THAT.....

MR HEATH... WHAT EVIDENCE WAS THERE THAT ISRAEL WAS INTENDING FORMALLY TO ANNEXE THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM? NO EVIDENCE WAS OR HAS BEEN PRODUCED. THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OWES IT TO THE HOUSE TO SAY SO.....

TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

MR. BROWN:.....

THERE ARE OTHER THINGS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT . I DO KNOW THAT NO ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY HAS TAKEN PLACE AND I AM RELIEVED ABOUT THAT....

MR. SHINWELL:..IN VIEW OF THE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH MR. KOSYGIN, PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND OTHERS, DID HE SEEK A CONVERSATION WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER BEFORE HE MADE HIS SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN ORDER TO ASCERTAIN WHAT THE INTENTIONS OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WERE? DID HE DO SO?.....

MR. BROWN:... AS TO WHETHER I DISCUSSED MY SPEECH WITH MR. EBAN BEFORE I MADE IT, THE ANSWER IS THAT I MOST CERTAINLY DID NOT. I AM ABOUT TO EXPLAIN IF THE HOUSE WILL HOLD ITSELF FOR A SECOND.

MANY DELEGATES, MANY OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS, MANY PRIME MINISTERS, WANTED TO SEE ME BEFORE I MADE MY SPEECH. I DECIDED THAT IF I SAW ANY OF THEM BEFORE I SPOKE THERE WAS THE GRAVEST RISK OF ITS BEING ALLEGED THAT WHAT I SAID WAS DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF SOMEONE OR OTHER. FOR THIS REASON - BECAUSE I HAD REASON TO WORRY ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN AND I WANTED TO DO WHAT I COULD TO ENSURE THAT IT DID NOT HAPPEN... I ASK MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND NOT TO IGNORE THE VALUE TO US OF OUR FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARABS AND NOT TO IGNORE THE CONTRIBUTION WE NEED TO MAKE IN THAT AREA. BUT ANY IDEA THAT I WILL ENGAGE IN DOUBLE TALK CAN BE WRITTEN OFF STRAIGHT AWAY.

I SPOKE TO EVERY SINGLE DELEGATE IN NEW YORK PRIVATELY, JUST AS I DID IN PUBLIC, IN EXACTLY THE SAME TERMS AND THEY ALL KNOW THE BASIS ON WHICH I THINK A SETTLEMENT SHOULD EMERGE.

SIR D'AVIGDOR-GOLDSMID: CAN THE FOREIGN SECTY SAY WHETHER, HAVING FAILED TO SPEAK TO THE ISRAELI FOREIGN SECTY BEFORE HE MADE HIS SPEECH, HE TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY OF SPEAKING TO HIM AFTERWARDS?

MR. BROWN: THERE WAS NO FAILURE TO SPEAK TO HIM BEFOREHAND. WOULD I HAVE SPOKEN TO THE EGYPTIANS BEFOREHAND? WOULD I HAVE SPOKEN TO THE SAUDI ARABIANS BEFOREHAND? WHY DOES ONE CHOOSE THE ISRAELIS AS THE ONE TO WHOM ONE SPEAKS TO BEFOREHAND WHILE REFUSING TO SPEAK TO ALL THE OTHERS?

SERVICE TELEX

I TOOK THE DECISION THAT THE RIGHT POSITION FOR HER MAJESTY'S FOREIGN SECTY WAS TO MAKE A SPEECH ON BEHALF OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVT AND OF HIS HOUSE BEFORE I DISCUSSED THE MERITS OF IT WITH ANYBODY ELSE'S FOREIGN MINISTER. AFTER I HAD MADE THE SPEECH I SAW THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER TWICE - TWICE - AND I SAW EVERYBODY ELSE - EVERY ARAB , AFRICAN, AND ASIAN, WHO WAS CONCERNED IN THE DISPUTE AT LEAST ONCE, MANY OF THEM ALSO TWICE, AND I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT ANYBODY ELSE IN MY POSITION WOULD HAVE DONE IT ANY OTHER WAY ROUND.

MR JOHN HYND: WHILE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO OBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NO TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT AS A RESULT OF THE WAR, MAY I ASK MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND TO GIVE AN ASSURANCE THAT HIS WORDS DO NOT MEAN THAT HE EXPECTS ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW DURING A STATE OF WAR WHICH SHE DID NOT WISH FOR BUT WHICH HAS BEEN INSISTED UPON THROUGHOUT BY COLONEL NASSER, THEREBY LEAVING THE GULF OF AQABA AND FREE ACCESS TO HER OWN TERRITORY AGAIN TO BE SUBJECT TO ARAB AGGRESSION?

MR. BROWN: THE RIGHT HON GENTLEMAN WILL SEE THAT IN THE SPEECH WHICH I MADE I DEALT WITH THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL. I SAID PUBLICLY AS I SAID PRIVATELY TO EVERYONE TO WHOM I SPOKE THAT WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE UNREALISTIC UNLESS SOME OTHER ISSUES WERE FACED BY OTHER PEOPLE. ON THE QUESTION OF THE GULF OF AQABA I BELIEVE THAT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WE MUST DO IS TO GET THAT INTERNATIONAL SEAWAY, AS WELL AS OTHERS, OPENED UP ON TERMS THAT WILL ENSURE THAT NO ONE WILL AGAIN BE IN ANY DOUBT AS TO THEIR CONTINUANCE AND THEIR REMAINING OPEN.

MR. MAUDLING: .....WILL THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, FOLLOWING UP THE QUESTION IMMEDIATELY BEFORE, MAKE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT IN TALKING ABOUT TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE NEGOTIATED ALTERATIONS OF FRONTIERS IN ORDER TO ENSURE SECURITY IN FUTURE ?

MR. BROWN: .... I FRANKLY BELIEVE THAT THESE ARE ISSUES THAT HAVE TO COME OUT IN THE FINAL SETTLEMENT WHICH I WANT TO BE A LASTING SETTLEMENT . I WANT IT TO BE ACCEPTABLE, EQUITABLE AND JUSTIFIABLE. IT WILL TAKE SOMZBITTLE TIME TO REACH, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT I WOULD HELP VERY MUCH BY PREJUDGING IT AND OFFERING A VIEW NOW AS TO WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE.

MR. ORME.... MAY I ASK WHAT PROGRESS HE HAS MADE WITH U THANT AND THE UNITED NATIONS FOR GETTING THE ADVISER INTO THE MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE? SECONDLY, CAN HE SAY WHAT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN DO, FOR THE REFUGEE PROBLEM?

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MR. BROWN: ... I DISCUSSED IT AT GREAT LENGTH WITH U THANT. IT WOULD BE WRONG TO SAY THAT I MADE A LOT OF PROGRESS BECAUSE IT IS RATHER EARLY IN THE DAY. I DISCUSSED IT AT LENGTH WITH MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND WITH VERY MANY MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY. MY RIGHT HONOURABLE AND NOBLE FRIEND LORD CARADON WHO IS OUR MINISTER THERE IS CARRYING ON WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THIS AND I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE WORKED OUT, BEFORE THE END OF THIS ASSEMBLY AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY IT WILL COME ABOUT.

ON THE QUESTION OF REFUGEES, IT IS NOW BEING WORKED ON AS TO HOW WE CAN ARRANGE FOR THEM TO BE LOOKED AFTER. WE HAVE MADE FUNDS AND OTHER COMFORTS AVAILABLE IN CONSIDERABLE QUANTITIES. WE WILL GO ON DOING THAT AND WILL DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO ENSURE THAT OTHER PEOPLE DO SO.

MR. PAGET: WOULD MY RIGHT HON FRIEND TELL US WHICH OF THE NATIONS WHOSE BOUNDARIES ARE TO BE ADJUSTED AS A RESULT OF THE RECENT WAR ARE LIKELY TO BE INFLUENCED BY ANYTHING WE SAY AS TO THE DECISIONS THEY TAKE UPON THAT SUBJECT ? WOULD NOT WE PERHAPS GET LESS ILL WILL IF WE WERE TO KEEP RATHER QUIET UPON QUESTIONS IN WHICH WE HAVE NO POWER TO MAKE OUR INFLUENCE FELT ?

MR. BROWN: THERE IS A WIDELY HELD VIEW, I AM TOLD, THAT IF ONE KEEPS QUIET, PEOPLE RESPECT ONE THE MORE. I AM BOUND TO TELL MY HON AND LEARNED FRIEND THAT THAT IS NOT MY EXPERIENCE.

MR. STRAUSS: IS MY RIGHT HON. FRIEND AWARE THAT HIS STATEMENT MADE IT APPEAR THAT HE AND THE GOVERNMENT WERE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO ANY BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENT WHICH MIGHT SECURE TO ISRAEL SOME GREATER SECURITY AGAINST THE PERMANENT THREAT OF EXTERMINATION BY ARMED FORCE BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES? CAN HE GIVE US CATEGORICAL ASSURANCE THAT HE DID NOT HAVE THAT IN MIND AND THAT THE QUESTION OF BOUNDARY ADJUSTMENTS REMAINS OPEN AS FAR AS THE GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED ?

MR. BROWN: I REFER MY RIGHT HON FRIEND TO WHAT I SAID, IF HE WILL DO ME THE HONOUR OF READING IT, HE WILL SEE THAT HIS SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION COULD NOT POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN BASED ON WHAT I SAID. .....

ENDS VS299/67 L.P.S.

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Being released today
26/6/67

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CIRCULAR RETRACT 88026
AN APPEAL ON BBC TELEVISION BY JOURNALIST JAMES CAERMON FOR ARAB REFUGEES LAST WEEK BROUGHT IN CONTRIBUTIONS TOTALLING 30,500 POUNDS STERLING FROM ALL OVER BRITAIN WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS. A SPOKESMAN AT THE RED CROSS HEADQUARTERS IN LONDON TOLD LPS TODAY (MONDAY), ''THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FINAL TOTAL. TWO DAYS' DELIVERY OF MAIL HAS NOT YET BEEN COUNTED AND DONATIONS ARE STILL POURING IN. ''A FURTHER APPEAL IS TO BE MADE TONIGHT ON INDEPENDENT TELEVISION.'' THE MONEY WILL BE ADMINISTERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES.
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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher KHT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM 70 TO Rabat

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 340 D M

[Date] 26 June R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

OF AZS 27.VI

27/VI

[464???]

CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM TRIPOLI.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 564 OF

26 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW

YORK AMMAN TEL AVIV JERUSALEM/BEIRUT JEDDA

KUWAIT BAHRAIN RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS KHARTOUM

WASHINGTON AND TROOPS CYRENAICA FOR WAKEFIELD

AND SAVING TO HOLY SEE PARIS TEHRAN RAWALPINDI

AND KUALA LUMPUR.

DISTRIBUTION

[336 EuS]
1076/62

YOUR TELNO 1291 TO AMMAN:

INTERNATIONALISATION OF JERUSALEM.

YOUR GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPEECH HAS BEEN USEFUL AND

GENERALLY WELL RECEIVED BY LIBYANS. BUT IN

PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF SUSPICION I DO NOT CONSIDER

WE SHOULD GAIN MERIT IN ARAB EYES BY OURSELVES

PROPOSING INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR JERUSALEM.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/Instead

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

1076 G.

INSTEAD I FULLY ENDORSE VIEW IN UKMIS NEW YORK

TEL NO 1512 TO YOU THAT WE SHOULD FOR THE PRESENT

STAND PAT ON YOUR UN STATEMENT. IF WE TRY TO

TAKE ANY INITIATIVE TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT AT PRESENT

STAGE WE SHALL ONLY DO FURTHER INJURY TO OUR

NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ARAB WORLD (YOUR

GUIDANCE 151). MY ARGUMENTS ARE:

(A) SO DELICATE DOES OUR POSITION STILL REMAIN

THAT ANY SUCH INITIATIVE COULD EASILY BE TWISTED

AGAINST US BY OUR ARAB ENEMIES.

(B) ARABS HAVE NOT YET PROPERLY BEGUN TO ACCEPT

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEFEAT. IT IS NOT

IN OUR INTERESTS TO TAKE THE LEAD IN BRINGING

THEM TO FACE HARSH FACTS.

(C) PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONALISATION BY US WOULD

BE REGARDED AS QUALIFICATION OF YOUR CONDEMNATION

IN UN OF ANY ISRAELI ATTEMPT TO HOLD ON TO THE

OLD CITY.

(D) THERE ARE SIGNS OF INFLUENTIAL LIBYANS STARTING

TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONALISATION

E.G. UNDER VATICAN AUSPICES (MYTEL 501 BENGHAZI

TEL NO 168 AND LIBYAN AMBASSADOR~S TALK WITH US

IN LONDON). THIS SEED SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO

/germinate

GERMINATE LONGER OF ITS OWN ACCORD.

(E) IT WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE FOR INTERNATIONALISATION PROPOSAL TO COME FROM A STATE WHICH ARABS REGARD AS NEUTRAL E.G. FRANCE. ALTERNATIVELY IT COULD USEFULLY BE MADE BY A NON ARAB MOSLEM STATE E.G. PAKISTAN OR MALAYSIA (IRAN IS REGARDED AS PRO ISRAELI). WE MIGHT DO SOME LOBBYING BUT IF SO IT MUST BE VERY DISCREET. I ALSO THINK WE SHOULD RESIST POSSIBLE US PRESSURE FOR US TO JOIN WITH THEM IN SUCH A PROPOSAL. SO FAR AS LIBYA IS CONCERNED THE AMERICANS ARE LESS VULNEY/RABLE ECONOMICALLY THAN WE ARE AND CAN BETTER AFFORD TO STICK THEIR NECKS OUT.

F O PASS RABAT 17. SOSFA.

1076

CONFIDENTIAL (10712)

OUTWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM ALGIERS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

No. 12 Saving
26 June, 1967

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 12 Saving of 26 June
Repeated for information Saving to:

Rabat 8
Tunis 9
Tripoli 5
Tel Aviv 6
Cairo 10
Amman 5
Jedda 5
Kuwait 3
Bahrain 3
Beirut 9
Belgrade 4
UKDEL NATO 4
Washington 44
Paris 35
Moscow 7
UKMIS New York 6
Rome 1
Madrid 3

Algeria and the M. East situation

The Algerian leaders are taking a long time to adapt to the changing situation in the M. East.

2. They are trying, in the face of a good deal of apathy, to keep the country in a state of war fever and to maintain the atmosphere of crisis. They have announced that military training establishments are to be open to all. Everyone is still "considered as mobilised" and it seems that no-one may leave the country unless on Government business. Shelters have been dug, cellars cleared out and gun emplacements prepared. Vigilance committees have been set up and brigades of volunteers are to be formed for para-military duties. Sacrifices are the order of the day and among those invited from the people are the purchase of non-redeemable solidarity bonds, the contribution of a day's salary and payment of a 5% tax.

3. The leadership itself seems to be under the influence of its own propaganda and is still reacting emotionally to events. Contradictory tendencies are at work in the Revolutionary Council and conflicting decisions are being taken. But some illusions must by now have been shed.

4. We know that there is bitter resentment against the Egyptians at all levels. Nasser's name was not mentioned in Boumedienne's 19 June speech and it looks (contrary to my prediction) as though the Algerians have this time decided to let him stew. This implies that they have made a realistic assessment of the military and other implications for the U.A.R. of the Israeli victory.

or that Boumedienne hopes to take this place?

5. The Algerians must also now be aware that there are limits to the support that the Soviet Union is able (or is prepared) to give. There has been no hint of what passed at Moscow; but such indications as there are suggest that Boumedienne got little more than the minimum i.e. promises of diplomatic support and continued military aid. There is little doubt that the Algerians were disappointed by the outcome of the visit, and they must have serious misgivings about the Glassborough talks. (It is odd, and could be significant, that the long-awaited high-level Russian visit has still not taken place. Which party is holding back?)

D.A. Rfm 28/6.
Q.S. Ags 28.VI
L.O. 29/6/67
L.A. 2/7
N Rae 4/7

/6.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. The Algerians seem to have been surprised and shocked by the strength of pro-Israel feeling in Europe, especially on the French left. The anti-European reaction may not go very deep: too many Algerians make their living in Europe, and the relationship with France is too complex and fundamental to be endangered by these emotional crises. But Boumedienne is no admirer of things European and in his speech of 19 June he drove home the point that the battle was against "all Europe".

7. It is less clear how far the Algerians admit to themselves that Arab solidarity is already crumbling and that economic sanctions are unlikely to work. In his speech of 19 June Boumedienne called on the Arabs to stand shoulder to shoulder and to use all the weapons in their possession, including a stoppage of oil production for one year. But it was the speech of a man with his back to the wall. If the report in Kuwait tel. No. 340 was correct, M. Bouteflika must already have told him, after the Kuwait meeting, that the major oil producers were side-stepping the ban. Developments since then should have removed any lingering doubts; and Algiers Radio has in fact attacked S. Arabia for continuing shipments. Yet only last week the Algerians, acting it may be assumed on orders from the top, took the unnecessary and damaging (to them) step of suspending gas shipments to the U.K.

8. As realities have begun to sink in, the exaltation of two weeks ago has been replaced by a kind of desperate determination to continue the struggle regardless of cost. For the time being, the summary analysis of means and ends in my tel No. 178 (not to all) remains broadly valid. But Algeria has, noticeably, turned in on herself. The emphasis now is less on her international standing, more on the home front and the need to build up her own strength.

9. To take these points separately.

10. Algeria has by no means renounced her claim to a position of leadership in the Arab world: quite the contrary. But, humiliated by the Arab defeat and baffled by Arab dissensions, the Algerians are for the moment fighting shy of groups and alliances (though they will no doubt keep close to like-minded Governments, such as the Iraqi). Instead, they are presenting themselves as the champions of the Arab peoples and stressing the popular nature of the war. This line, like their insistence that Palestine is only one battlefield, has obvious advantages for them. It is flexible, allowing them to shrug off temporary setbacks, and it enables them to draw attention to their own liberation struggle and their championship of liberation movements everywhere.

11. On the home front, steps have been taken (some of the less serious ones have been mentioned above) to increase military preparedness. We do not know whether the Russians have resumed arms deliveries, but it would be reasonable to expect them to do so. On the economic front steps are being taken to make Algeria more self sufficient and less vulnerable to imperialist pressures. How far these steps have been taken in response to the new situation, and how far they are the acceleration of a process already under way, is open to argument. But their effect has been, broadly, to cut trade and financial links with the west (France excepted - but even she will be hit by the restrictions on imports) and to create new links with East Europe: meanwhile at home commercial and financial operations are being brought under

/tight

tight State control.

12. The fact that these policies will lead to restrictions and austerity and are bound to set back the development of the country will not prevent the Algerian leaders in their present mood from trying them on. No doubt judging that their hold on the country is not at present threatened, they appear for the time being to have joined hands with the extreme advocates of nationalisation and State control and to have decided to ignore the interests of the non-political masses.

13. This goes to press while the General Assembly debate is in progress.

DAWBARN

London Press Service
Verbatim Service

VERBATIM SERVICE 290 25TH JUNE 1967

MIDDLE EAST.

THE FOLLOWING IS A VERBATIM TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JUNE 26 ON HIS VISIT TO NEW YORK.

WITH YOUR PERMISSION, MR. SPEAKER, AND THAT OF THE HOUSE, I WISH TO MAKE A STATEMENT ON MY VISIT TO NEW YORK.

DURING THE FIVE DAYS THAT I WAS IN THE UNITED STATES I ADDRESSED THE EMERGENCY SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY., I HAD LONG AND VALUABLE TALKS IN WASHINGTON WITH PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND IN NEW YORK WITH MR. KOSYGIN AND MR. GROMYKO, WITH MR. RUSK, MONSIEUR COUVE DE MURVILLE AND WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES OF ALMOST ALL THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THE MAIN THEME OF MY SPEECH TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WAS TO EMPHASIZE THE URGENT NEED TO BEGIN TO DEAL AT ONCE WITH PRACTICAL PROBLEMS - THE THINGS WE COULD DO AND OUGHT TO BE DOING NOW. I SPOKE ALSO ABOUT SOME OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY FINAL SETTLEMENT. IN PARTICULAR I REFERRED TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER WHICH CALL FOR ALL COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY. I MADE IT CLEAR ALSO THAT IN OUR VIEW ALL STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD A RIGHT TO LIVE IN GENUINE INDEPENDENCE SPEAKING ON THE LINES OF THE SPEECH I MADE IN NOTTINGHAM JUST BEFORE I WENT I SAID THAT TERRITORIAL AGGRANDISEMENT AS A RESULT OF WAR WAS CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND THAT OTHER ELEMENTS IN A FINAL SETTLEMENT MUST BE A LONG OVERDUE SOLUTION OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM, THE NECESSITY FOR FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS FOR THE SHIPS OF ALL NATIONS AND THE URGENT REQUIREMENT FOR AN AGREEMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION. ALL THIS WOULD, NO DOUBT, REQUIRE LONG AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION AND IT IS TOO EARLY TO SEE THE OUTCOME. MEANWHILE THERE ARE CERTAIN PRACTICAL STEPS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN NOW. THESE INCLUDED NOMINATION BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF A REPRESENTATIVE, OF UNQUESTIONED STANDING, WHO SHOULD GO AT ONCE TO THE AREA AND ADVISE ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE CEASE-FIRE. IN PARTICULAR HE COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION AND UPON THE FORM WHICH A NEW UNITED NATIONS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST MIGHT TAKE. THERE WERE A RANGE OF URGENT PROBLEMS ALSO RELATING TO THOSE WHO HAD HAD TO FLEE FROM THEIR HOMES AS A RESULT OF THE WAR. NOT ONLY MUST THEY BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES, BUT THE UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY AND THE VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS MUST BE PROVIDED URGENTLY WITH THE MEANS OF RELIEVING THEIR DISTRESS.

APART FROM THESE PROBLEMS I SPOKE OF THE URGENT NEED TO GET THE SUEZ CANAL OPEN AGAIN AND I DEALT VERY FIRMLY WITH THE VICIOUS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT BRITISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHTING. I ENDED MY SPEECH WITH A SOLEMN WARNING THAT IF THE UNITED NATIONS MADE NO PROGRESS INVOLVING THESE PROBLEMS, THERE WAS A VERY REAL DANGER THAT IT MIGHT GO THE WAY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

I HAD BEEN THE FIRST SPEAKER TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO TACKLE URGENT PRACTICAL PROBLEMS NOW AND I WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE DEGREE OF SUPPORT THAT I RECEIVED FOR THIS FROM SUBSEQUENT SPEAKERS. THE SPEECH WAS I THINK WELL RECEIVED IN THE UNITED NATIONS ITSELF AND IN NEWSPAPER, TELEVISION AND RADIO COMMENT IN NEW YORK. I GATHER THAT IT HAS HAD A MORE MIXED RECEPTION IN THIS COUNTRY. I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT WE MUST AT ALL COSTS AVOID FALLING INTO THE TRAP OF APPLYING A DOUBLE STANDARD. WOULD A SIMILAR LINE HAVE BEEN TAKEN IF THE WAR HAD GONE THE OTHER WAY? - FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE ARAB AIR FORCE HAD STRUCK FIRST AND IF ARAB ARMIES HAD OCCUPIED SIGNIFICANT PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OF ISRAEL? WHAT WOULD THEN HAVE BEEN SAID ABOUT THE PERMANENT RETENTION OF TERRITORIAL GAINS MADE BY CONQUEST?

AS FOR THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM, MAY I REMIND THE HOUSE OF THE ATTITUDE OF SUCCESSIVE BRITISH GOVERNMENTS IN THE PAST. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN IN 1949 LEFT THE CITY DIVIDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND THIS DE FACTO PARTITION PERSISTED UNTIL THE RECENT HOSTILITIES. BUT A GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 9 DECEMBER, 1949 PROVIDED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A UNIFIED CITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, ALONG WITH MOST OTHER WESTERN GOVERNMENTS, HAVE ALWAYS WITHHELD RECOGNITION OF THE CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER JERUSALEM BY BOTH JORDAN AND ISRAEL PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT. FOR THIS REASON OUR EMBASSY IN ISRAEL, LIKE THOSE OF MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, IS IN TEL AVIV AND NOT IN JERUSALEM. OUR CONSUL-GENERAL IN JERUSALEM IS SUBORDINATE NEITHER TO THE AMBASSADOR IN TEL AVIV NOR TO THE AMBASSADOR IN AMMAN BUT DIRECTLY TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.

I THEREFORE WENT ON IN MY SPEECH IN NEW YORK TO WARN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT NOT TO INJECT ANOTHER COMPLICATION INTO THE SITUATION WHICH IS ALREADY MORE THAN SUFFICIENTLY COMPLICATED BY PURPORTING TO ANNEX THE OLD CITY. THIS IS NOT SIMPLY A PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOLY PLACES. IT IS NOT SIMPLY A PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO THE HOLY PLACES. OF COURSE WE ARE ALL IN FAVOUR OF FREE ACCESS BY ALL - JEWS, CHRISTIANS AND MOSLEMS - TO THEIR PLACES OF WORSHIP. THE PROBLEM IS ONE OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER TERRITORY AND THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT WOULD IN MY VIEW BE VERY UNWISE INDEED TO ATTEMPT TO PREJUDGE THE FORM OF AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. I AM NOT ASKING FOR THE RETURN OF A DIVIDED JERUSALEM NOR DO I WANT TO FORECAST WHAT THE EVENTUAL ARRANGEMENTS MAY BE, EXCEPT TO REPEAT THAT ANY LASTING SETTLEMENT OF WHICH THEY FORM PART MUST AMONG OTHER THINGS CLEARLY RECOGNISE THE RIGHT OF ALL STATES CONCERNED TO LIVE IN TRUE DIGNITY AND TRUE FREEDOM.

I SPENT THE REST OF MY TIME DISCUSSING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND BILATERAL PROBLEMS WITH THOSE WHO HAD COME TO NEW YORK TO ATTEND THE ASSEMBLY.

IT WOULD NOT BE PROPER TO GO INTO DETAILS OF CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSIONS, BUT THE HOUSE MAKE TAKE IT THAT I LEFT THOSE ARAB DELEGATES CONCERNED IN NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE TO THEIR COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED INTERRUPTION OF OUR OIL SUPPLIES AND TO THE CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THIS IS A MATTER IN WHICH WE MUST OF COURSE WORK WITH OUR FRIENDS WHO SHARE AN INTEREST IN GETTING THE CJNAL REOPENED. I MIGHT ADD THAT THIS INTEREST IS NOT ALL ONE-SIDED., THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ITSELF IS A HEAVY LOSER AS A RESULT OF THE CLOSURE OF THIS INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. I ALSO HAD VALUABLE TALKS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM AREAS OTHER THAN THE MIDDLE EAST.

AS REGARDS THE FUTURE, MUCH WILL DEPEND ON THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS WHICH TOOK PLACE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND MR. KOSYGIN. I WOULD EXPECT THE DEBATE IN THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY TO CONTINUE FOR AT LEAST A WEEK AND MAYBE LONGER. DURING THIS TIME THERE WILL BE MUCH DISCUSSION ON THE FLOOR AND BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE KIND OF RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD COMMAND A MAJORITY VOTE IN THE ASSEMBLY. HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE OF COURSE TAKING A FULL PART IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WHAT WILL BE THE OUTCOME.

I BELIEVE THAT MY VISIT TO NEW YORK ENABLED ME TO URGE UPON ALL IN THE UNITED NATIONS THE VITAL NECESSITY OF TACKLING THE IMMEDIATE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. I WAS ALSO ABLE TO MAKE CLEAR IN MY SPEECH AND IN MY NUMEROUS PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS THAT THE MAIN INTEREST OF THE UNITED KINGDOM WAS IN A LASTING SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ALL PARTIES: EQUITABLE AND THEREFORE JUSTIFIABLE.

END VS 298

London Press Service
Verbatim Service

VERBATIM SERVICE 290 26TH JUNE 1967

MIDDLE EAST.

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~~10710~~
1076

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

27 June, 1967.

I have reported separately the commercial aspects of the unofficial but none the less real anti-Jewish campaign at present being conducted here. In this letter I consider its more general implications.

2. Although a note of hostility towards Moroccan Jews crept into the press even before the fighting started and remained there half-submerged during the war ("A delegation of Jews from Marrakech asked to go to Palestine to fight. A commentator asked them On which side?)", it was only after the Arab defeat and the acceptance of the ceasefire that the campaign gathered momentum. The original line "learn to distinguish which are the Zionists among your Jewish neighbours" (Al-Alam of 13 June) soon changed to "Jews are always Fifth Columnists" (Al-Alam of 23 June), although as early as 13 June a new "humorous" magazine, Al Jaha, stated that "Moroccan Jews are nothing but Zionists". It was at this time anti-Jewish slogans started appearing in the press.

3. The propaganda campaign is being waged on very strongly emotional lines. Much emphasis is given to the desecration of the holy places of Islam by the very fact of their occupation by non-Moslem forces and also to allegations of Israeli-atrocities; this creates the necessary feeling of unease in Moroccans, who are thus receptive to the stories then fed to them of Jews here who have defied the national sentiment by dancing in the streets (etc.) to celebrate the Arab defeat. This is evidently a fruitful line to take, as the most far-fetched variants of this theme are constantly pumped out.

4. This propaganda seems to be achieving the desired result of a popular revulsion against local Jews.

a) On the industrial front. The UMT journal L'Avant Garde of 24 June devotes a considerable amount of space to the

/Zionist.....

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Zionist menace, reporting at length a demand by the local UMT leaders in Casablanca for a purge of all Zionist elements from the public services. At the same time it reports similar resolutions passed by other trade union bodies under the general headline "Zionist Provocations", and in its report of a particular strike it highlights the fact that: "The Zionist director of this company threatened the workers with dismissal and the closing down of the factory if they did not resume work. But two days after the cowardly Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arabs, this Polish Jew called Parna put his plan into effect." From other sources too there are stories of Moroccan workers not turning up for work in Jewish firms, and of Moroccan employers locking out their Jewish members of staff.

B) On the professional front. Various organisations have been active in hounding out Jews, but none more so than the lawyers, and a number of Jewish lawyers have been expelled from their associations.

c) Personal. There have been a number of reports recently of murders of Jews though it is of course difficult to connect these definitely with any political trend. Be that as it may, it is certainly true that some Jews have left the country, particularly women and children. Most of these are merely "taking the opportunity of an early holiday" and will not necessarily have gone for good; and in any case, as you will have seen from Patrick Johnston's letter to John Lewen SO/ 0/67 of 20 June, exchange control measures represent a considerable obstacle to their so doing. Johnston's letter also makes the point that some Moroccan businessmen are happy to use the boycott as a means of settling personal scores with successful Jewish rivals.

/5.....

5. In the face of this considerable agitation against Jews the government was forced to state its own position clearly. On 15 June the Minister of Information made a statement at a press conference in which he affirmed the full rights of Jewish citizens unless they indulged in Zionist activities; and he added unequivocably that the government would not tolerate assaults and persecution. The State alone has the right to act to preserve law and order". The local Jewish population now believes more than ever before that it owes its continued safety to the King and the present regime. On the other hand the government does not appear to have felt able to tone down or suppress the verbal excesses of the opposition press, but its own mouthpiece Al-Anbaa has not lent itself to such attacks on Moroccan Jews, though its opposition to Israel and Zionism is total and committed.

6. Meanwhile the UNFP-financed Maghreb Informations is continuing its regular practice of publishing the prices of Israeli citrus fruit on the "Dusseldorf market!

7. Since drafting the above I have seen Patrick Johnston's letter of 26 June to John Lewen, which tends to confirm what I have said above but is much more pessimistic in its tone. I will keep an eye open and report to you further.

(A. L. Southorn)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

/Revolutionary

CONFIDENTIAL.

1076

Minutes.

Moroccan Troops and the Middle East War.

I understand that the Moroccan authorities are well aware of the fact that they were given the cold shoulder during this war which Jamal Abdul Nasser wanted to star his/Socialist Group alone. In case of victory - of which his arrogance had made him sure - he would have a come back on Monarchies and other states he labels as reactionary and pro-colonialist and in case of failure, he would lay the blame on them for failing to collaborate. For this reason when he was preparing hostilities, he got in touch only with his Socialist Group. But his plan was frustrated when King Hassan ignored the rebuff and sent his Personal Representative to look into the situation and to see if help is needed. King Hussein went farther by behaving as he did. Notwithstanding disregard of King Hassan's invitation to a Summit Consultation before hostilities were launched, he sent out armies so that the Socialist Group might not turn his people against him in case he does not. Tunisia and Saudi Arabia also did their part. King Hussein admitted the Saudi forces into his territory but Nasser and his group almost disdained Moroccan and Tunisian help and left them almost to rot in the hot Libyan desert until they were recalled. And now, for saving their face, some Moroccans are laying the blame on the treachery of some Egyptian officers, but those higher up are better aware of the real situation, and even say that the real reason for the dismissal from office or the arrest and trial of some Egyptian officers was because they were planning a coup d'état against Abdul Nasser and the whole set up.

A. Hassouna
27/6/1967.

D.A. Please see minute Ag. 29/6.
H.E.
28/VI

CONFIDENTIAL.

M.F.P

SERVICE ◇ SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

PRODROME RABAT
01 OP RABATMOM
PRODROME RABAT5

CENTROFORM LDN

1076

CORRECTION TO VS 299. 27/6/67.

CORRECTION TO VS 299. AFTER FOURTH PARAGRAPH WHICH ENDS ''THE FOREIGN SECRETARY OWES IT TO THE HOUSE TO SAY SO .... ''PLEASE INSERT THE FOLLOWVNG:

MR. BROWN: .... THERE IS A VERY DISTINGUISHED TEAM OF PEOPLE WHO SERVE IN OUR POSTS ABROAD MOST OF THEM KNOWN TO HIM, AND A VERY DISTINGUISHED TEAM OF ADVISERS, ON ALL OF WHOM HE RELIED. I HAD EVERY REASON TO TAKE THE MOMENT FOR SAYING WHAT I SAID.

MR. THORPE .... WOULD HE NOT AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL IF OUR PRESENT STAND NOW WERE TO INDICATE THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO REVIVE FRIENDSHIP WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES AT THE PRICE OF SELLING THE ISRAELIS DOWN THE RIVER?

MR. BROWN .... THAT IS NEVER A CHARGE THAT COULD EVER BE REALLY LEVIED AT ME WITH ANY JUSTICE. FOR VERY HIGHLY PERSONAL REASONS, I HAVE EVERY REASON FOR CARING ABOUT THE INTEGRITY, PEACEFUL DEFENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIVE OF ISRAEL AND THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST CHANCE OF MY FORGETTING THAT. BRITAIN HAS IMPORTANT, VITAL INTERESTS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD AND A BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY HAS TO CONSIDER THEM AS WELL AS OTHER THINGS. THAT IS WHAT I WAS TRYING TO DO.

MR. WILLIAM HAMILTON .... CAN HE SAY WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN ANY RESPONSE BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO HIS SUGGESTION THAT JERUSALEM SHOULD BE REGARDED AS MORE OR LESS AN INTERNATIONAL FREE CITY IN VIEW OF WHAT IS REPORTED IN THE PRESS TODAY ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM TO THIS MATTER?

SERVICE TELEX ◇

MR. BROWN .... I HAVE HAD NO COMMENT FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM'S FUTURE, NOR WOULD I EXPECT IT AT THE MOMENT. BUT I SAID IN MY SPEECH THAT THIS MUST BE PART OF THE FINAL SETTLEMENT. THERE ARE OTHER THINGS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. I DO KNOW THAT NO ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY HAS TAKEN PLACE AND I AM RELIEVED ABOUT THAT ....

PLEASE DELETE THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH BEGINNING ''MR. BROWN ... THERE ARE OTHER THINGS'' AND ENDING ''I AM RELIEVED ABOUT THAT ..''

THE REST OF VS 299 BEGINNING AT SIXTH PARAGRAPH ''MR. SHINWELL .. IN VIEW OF THE CONVE

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PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN WERE CUT OFF
HERE FROM LAST GOOD PARA

MMM

PLEASE DELETE THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH BEGINNING ''MR. BROWN ... THERE ARE OTHER THINGS'' AND ENDING ''I AM RELIEVED ABOUT THAT ..''

THE REST OF VS 299 BEGINNING AT SIXTH PARAGRAPH ''MR. SHINWELL .. IN VIEW OF THE CONVERSATIONS'' IS CORRECT.

END CORRECTION TO VS299.

PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

◇ TELEX SERVICE

SERVICE TELEX ◇

PRODROME RABAT

PRODROME LONDON

1076.

PRODROME RABAT

FOR 1 FO LDN GRS 1960A 280530Z

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO RABAT

TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 27 JUNE 1967

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 3364 OF 27 JUNE AND TO AMMAN TEL AVIV BEIRUT BAHRAIN RABAT ALGIERS TUNIS TRIPOLI BENGHAZE CAIRO KHARTOUM JEDDA AND H.C. ADEN.

MIDDLE EAST.

FOLLOWING ARE EXTRACTS FROM INTERVIEW GIVEN BY FOREIGN SECRETARY TO TELEVISION PROGRAMME QUOTE THIS WEEK UNQUOTE ON 27 JUNE.

QUESTION: MR BROWN YOU HAVE BEEN AT THE CENTRE OF YET ANOTHER STORM THIS TIME OVER ADEN AND YOUR SPEECH AT THE UNITED NATIONS. LET'S START WITH THE U.N. ARE YOU REALLY PRO- ARAB?

ANSWER: NO, MOST CERTAINLY NOT. ON THE OTHER HAND I THINK THEY HAVE A CASE THAT IS NOT OFTEN HEARD ENOUGH: NOT OFTEN LISTENED TO ENOUGH, AND I TRY TO TAKE CARE TO SEE THAT IT IS. I ALSO UNDERSTAND WHAT A LOT OF PEOPLE - OTHER PEOPLE - DON'T SEEM TO UNDERSTAND, THAT BRITAIN HAS TREMENDOUS INTERESTS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, AND THEY HAVE TO TAKEN CARE OF TOO. BUT IF WHEN YOU ASK ME AM I PRO-ARAB - MEANING AS AGAINST ISRAEL - THE ANSWER IS MOST CERTAINLY NOT.

QUESTION: BUT WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN YOUR MIND AT THE MOMENT? IS IT TO RE-BUILD THE BRIDGES WITH THE ARAB NATIONS?

ANSWER: I HAVE TO TAKE THAT VERY MUCH INTO ACCOUNT. BUT I WOULDN'T SAY THAT'S UPPERMOST IN MY MIND. WHAT IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND IS TO GET THIS TIME A LASTING SETTLEMENT - MAY I REPEAT THE WORD, LASTING SETTLEMENT - BY WHICH EACH OF THE COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA CAN LIVE WITHOUT FEAR - AS I PUT IT IN NEW YORK, WITH TRUE DIGNITY, EARN THEIR LIVING IN PEACE. THIS IS UPPERMOST IN MY MIND, BUT OF COURSE I MUST TAKE THE OTHER INTO ACCOUNT.

QUESTION: WITH SUCH AN EMOTIVE PROBLEM AS THIS IS IT POSSIBLE TO SAY ANYTHING, HOWEVER TECHNICALLY NEUTRAL IT MIGHT BE, WHICH DOESN'T OFFEND ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER?

ANSWER: I DOUBT THAT - I THINK, THIS IS WHAT I TRIED TO SAY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS YESTERDAY - I DOUBT WHETHER ANY FOREIGN SECRETARY COULD SAY ANYTHING ON THIS SUBJECT - UNLESS HE WERE AN ABSOLUTE NEUTER - THAT WOULDN'T, IN FACT, DISTURB SOMEBODY, AN I THINK ONE OF THE PROBLEMS BEING WITH THIS JOB - AND I AM NOT A MAN WITHOUT FEELINGS MYSELF - IS THAT YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT YOU ARE ALMOST CERTAIN TO DISTURB SOMEBODY.

SERVICE TELEX ◇

QUESTION: THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL, MR. ESHKOL, IS ON THE RECORD AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TERRITORIAL AGGRANDIZMENT. BY ORDERING ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, WHICH IS THE INTERPRETATION OF YOUR SPEECH, ARE YOU NOT ENCOURAGING THOSE PEOPLE IN ISRAEL, LIKE GENERAL DAYAN, WHO WISH TO HANG ONTO SOME OF THOSE GAINS?

ANSWER: I DIDN'T EITHER ORDER ISRAEL TO PULL BACK, OR EVEN SAY THAT SHE SHOULD. WHAT I SAID WAS THAT SHE SHOULDN'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ORON THE ONES WE ALREADY HAD: AND I ASKED HER TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM. I DIDN'T MENTION WITHDRAWAL. NOW IN MY OWN VIEW, AND I SAID THIS TO EVERYBODY I SAW IN NEW YORK, ALL THE ARAB DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE AFRICAN DELEGATES I SAW, ALL THE ASIAN DELEGATES I SAW, MR KOSYGIN, MR JOHNSON, I SAID THAT WITHDRAWAL WILL REQUIRE SOME BALANCING THINGS THAT ISRAEL WILL NEED TO KNOW , THIS TIME, THAT SHE CAN LIVE. LIKE OTHER COUNTRIES, JORDAN, WILL NEED TO KNOW THAT SHE CAN LIVE. NOW I MADE THIS ALL QUITE CLEAR, ALL I SAID IN MY SPEECH WHICH PEOPLE FASTENED ON, DON'T PILE ANOTHER PROBLEM ON AN ALREADY COMPLICATED SITUATION. AND I THINK THEY HAVE BEEN VERY WISE NOT TO DO IT.

QUESTION:

NOW YOU SAY THAT ISRAEL MUST LIVE, BUT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT A RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR, AND AS WELL, RIGHT OF ACCESS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL?

ANSWER:

I MEAN THAT INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS MUST BE OPEN TO US ALL. NOW I WOULDN'T FUSS. I KNOW WHAT YOU WANT TO DO BUT I WOULDN'T DO IT. I WOULDN'T FASTEN EITHER THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, OR THE SUEZ CANAL ONTO ISRAEL. YOU WON'T HELP ISRAEL IF YOU DO. YOU WON'T HELP THE ARABS IF YOU DO. YOU WON'T HELP US IF YOU DO. BUT I THINK YOU CAN FASTEN BOTH ON THE RIGHTS OF MARITIME NATIONS TO HAVE GUARANTEED ACCESS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WATER-WAYS. NOW I THINK WE CAN DO THIS, AND ONE OF THE THINGS I SAID IN NEW YORK WAS THAT WE, IN OUR RESOLUTION THAT WE WORK OUT, WE OUGHT TO HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE. BUT THEN WE HAVE TO WORK OUT SOME OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE WE HAVE THAT KIND OF GUARANTEE SO FAR AS THE SUEZ CANAL IS CONCERNED ALREADY,UT THEN IT GETS MESSED UP.

QUESTION:
BUT IT'S NEVER BEEN OPERATED.....
ANSWER:
BY THE COMPLICATIONS. WELL IT GET'S MESSED UP B Y INTERNAL COMPLI-
ATIONS. SO, THEREFORE, WE HAVE NOW TO THINK ABOUT THE OTHER
PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COUNTRIES.
HOW YOU ARRANGE THEM. HOW THEY ARE SUPERVISED. I THINK THIS
IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO ADDRESS OUR ATTENTION TO AT THE MOMENT.
QUESTION:
YOU DON'T THINK THAT YOU SHOULD GO INTO THIS QUESTION OF GUARANTEES,
AFTER ALL THIS IS WHERE THE PRESENT CRISIS BEGAN. BRITAIN SAID -
AT THE TIME THE STRAITS OF TIRAN WERE CLOSED BY EGYPT, THAT
THE RIGHTS OF INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION SHOULD BE ENSURED.
WE WERE NOT ABLE TO DO IT. THE ISRAELIS HAD TO DO THAT. NOW
WHAT CAN WE DO NOW?
ANSWER:
BECAUSE WE STARTED AT THE WRONG POINT. LET'S NOW - IF I MAY SUGGEST-
START AT A DIFFERENT POINT. LET'S DEAL WITH THE PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS. THE REFUGEES. THE RIGHTS OF NATIONS. THEN LET'S
LOOK AT THE AUTHORITIES WHO COULD ENSURE THAT THE WATER-WAYS
STAY OPEN, IF WE DO IT THAT WAY ROUND WE MAY DO A JOLLY SIGHT
BETTER THAN WE DID LAST TIME.
QUESTION:
YOU WANT TO HAVE THIS SOLUTION THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS,
DON'T YOU?
ANSWER:
OH, VERY MUCH - YES.
QUESTION:
NOW DO YOU REALLY THINK THAT ISRAEL CAN EXPECT TO GET JUSTICE
FROM THE UNITED NATIONS?
ANSWER:
YES. IT'S THE ONLY PLACE WHERE ANYBODY CAN, IN THE END, GET
JUSTICE FROM. ISRAEL - ALRIGHT, WON THIS PARTICULAR WAR. ISRAEL
COULDN'T BE SURE - ALWAYS, OF WINNING ANY SUBSEQUENT WAR. HER
ONLY GUARANTEE IS IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THERE ISN'T GOING TO
BE A SUBSEQUENT WAR.
QUESTION:
BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER WHETHER IT WAS YOU OR THE PRIME MINISTER
IN THE DEBATE BEFORE THE WAR BEGAN WHO SAID THAT THE UNITED
NATIONS WAS EVER READY TO CONDEMN ISRAEL FOR AGRESSION INTO
THE ARAB COUNTRIES BUT THEY NEVER CONDEMBED THE ARAB COUNTRIES.
ANSWER:

SERVICE TELEX

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I NEVER SAID THAT - I DON'T KNOW WHO DID SAY IT, BUT I CERTAINLY NEVER DID. BUT I'M SURE- MR. FFITCH - I'M SURE AS I CAN BE THAT ISRAEL'S HOPE, AND IT'S THE HOPE OF JORDAN - IT'S THE HOPE OF MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA OF THE WORLD, IS THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CAN, IN FACT, ENSURE SOME POLICING ARRANGEMENTS. SOME SUPERVISIORY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WILL WORK: AND THIS NOT ONLY APPLIES TO THE WATER-WAYS, IT APPLES TO THE BOUNDARIES - APPLIES TO A LOT OF OTHER THINGS INDEED. AN I THINK THAT THIS IS WHAT WE OUGHT TO WORK FOR. THIS IS WHY I ASKED WHEN I WAS THERE, THAT WE - THE SECRETARY GENERAL, SHOULD PUT A REPRESENTATIVE INTO THE AREA. THIS IW WHY I SAID WE SHOULD STRENGTHEN THE TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANISATION. THIS IS WHY I SAID WE SHOULD DISCUSS A KIND OF NEW UNITED NATIONS FORCE THAT COULD GO IN. SOME DAY, SOME DAY ISRAEL, AND HER ARAB NEIGHBOURS WILL LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER - QUITE NATURALLY. UNTIL THAT HAPPENS, THEN OTHER ARRANGEMENTS HAVE TO BE MADE.

// Withdrawn in ~~withdrawing~~ referring to a part in Mr Brown's statement to Commons on 31/5

QUESTION:

BUT WOULD YOU AGREE THAT THAT UNITED NATIONS FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE THAT SIMPLY COULD NOT BE ORDERED OUT BY PRESIDENT NASSER AGAIN, WHEN IT WAS CONVENIENT FOR HIM.

ANSWER:

MOST CERTAINLY, AND MAY I MATCH THAT BY SAYING THE NEXT TIME THE ISRAELIS MUSN'T REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SOIL, AS THEY DID FOR A VERY LONG TIME, AND ONE OF THEIR BIGGEST MISTAKES - AND I'M NOT NOW TALKING WITH HINDSIGHT, BECAUSE I SAID IT TO THEM A LONG TIME AGO - WAS TO REFUSE TO HAVE IT ON THEIR SIDE OF THE BORDER TOO.

QUESTION:

THE CRITISISM DIRECTED AGINST THE GOVERNMENT, BOTH WITHIN YOUR OWN PARTY, AND FROM THE OPPOSITION, IS THAT YOUR POLICY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS HAS HELPED NOBODY, BUT HAS DAMAGED BRITAIN.

ANSWER:

IF YOU ARE IN A SITUATION, LETS FACE IT, WHERE YOU CAN'T TAKE A STAND ON BEHALF OF ONE OR THE OTHER PARTIES, IT IS, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, IN THE HOUSE, DIFFICULT TO HOLD - IT DOESN'T MEAN IT'S DONE US DAMAGE.

QUESTION:

WELL, IT'S CUT OFF OUR OIL, HASN'T IT?

ANSWER:

NO NO, NO NO - LOOK THE OIL IS FLOWING, THIS IS NOT SOMETHING WE TALK ABOUT TOO PLAINLY - I WOULDN'T WORRY IF I WERE YOU, TOO MUCH ABOUT THAT: BUT IF YOU ARE GOING TO HOLD A INDEPENDENT POSITION, OF COURSE YOU ARE VULNERABLE TO CRITICISM AND TO ATTACK, BUT MR. FFITCH, THE BUSINESS OF A MINISTER AT THIS MOMENT IS TO SEE THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE UP - HELD, HOWEVER DIFFICULT IT MAY BE: THAT WE ARE DOING.

QUESTION:

SO THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN THIS MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WHICH HAS AFFECTED YOUR VIEW OF THE ROLE THAT BRITAIN SHOULD PLAY IN THE WORLD?

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

ANSWER:

I HAS RATHER STRENGTHENED IT AS A MATTER OF FACT - I DON'T BELIEVE IT'S A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH SHIPS AND GUNS AND BATTALIONS. IT'S A ROLE YOU OUGHT TO PLAY WITH COMMERCIAL INTERESTS, FINANCIAL INTERESTS, AND A GENUINE POLITICAL CONCERN FOR OTHER PEOPLE, AND ABOVE ALL, OF COURSE, FOR THE UNDERDOG - FOR THE UNDER DEVELOPED OF THE WORLD. I THINK WHAT THIS HAS SHOWN UP, IS THAT YOU CAN PLAY THAT ROLE, YOU WILL BE ATTACKED BY THOSE WHO THINK THEY'RE A LITTLE BIT BETTER OFF THAN THE OTHERS, BUT YOU WILL BE VERY MUCH WELCOMED BY THOSE WHO NEED YOUR SUPPORT.

QUESTION:

FOREIGN SECRETARY, WE DO HAVE SHIPS AND GUNS AND PLANES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IF YOU ARE GOING TO FORCE THROUGH THE TIRAN STRAITS, YOU WOULD HAVE HAD TO USE THEM. PEOPLE WANT TO KNOW WHY ARE WE MAINTAINING THESE FORCES AT GREAT EXPENSE, NOT JUST AT ADEN, BUT AT THE PERSIAN GULF, IF THEY ARE NOT IN FACT, ABLE TO GUARANTEE US OIL SUPPLIES.

ANSWER:

YOU CAN'T GUARANTEE YOURSELVES OIL SUPPLIES BY GUNS, SHIPS AND AIRPLANES, ON THE OTHER HAND YOU CAN MAINTAIN ALLIANCES AND ARRANGEMENTS, THIS WAY FOR A TIME. WE ARE NOT MAINTAINING ALL THAT MUCH - OUR SHIPS THAT WERE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, WERE IN FACT, EN PASSAGE: THEY WERE MOVING: WE DIDN'T HAVE A SIXTH FLEET THERE: WE ARE UNWINDING OUR COMMITMENTS, BUT IT TAKES TIME TO DO IT, AND WE ARE DOING IT IN A VERY SENSIBLE WAY. IN THE 1964/6 DEFENSE REVIEW WE UNWOUND A LOT OF COMMITMENTS OF THIS KIND, WE ARE NOW LOOKING AT WHAT WE CAN UNWIND IN THE FUTURE.

SOSFA GROUPS 1960A SENT AT 28/0317Z AJN

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PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

Telno Guidance 161 27 June 1967 (JIPGD)

UNCLASSIFIED

British Aid for Arab Refugees.

The British Government have made a number of announcements recently on the subject of aid for Arab refugees and for Jordan. They can be summarised as follows.

UNRWA

We have made an additional emergency contribution of $500,000 to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in addition to $4.5 million already pledged as our contribution for 1967.

2. Since UNRWA was set up in 1950 we have contributed 14% of its total budget. Our total contribution at the end of 1966 amounted to $95.5 million. This compares with the contributions of other countries as follows:-

United States	$387.4 million
Canada	$ 18.6 million
France	$ 12.4 million
U.A.R.	$ 5.3 million
Sweden	$ 4.5 million
West Germany	$ 3.6 million
Australia	$ 3.4 million
Other countries	$ 20.7 million
Soviet Union	Nil

Jordan

3. We have agreed to provide a grant of £500,000 for urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction projects in Jordan.

4. £20,000 worth of blankets and medical supplies have been sent to Amman from British Government stocks in Cyprus.

5. Please seek to make these facts known in whatever way you consider appropriate.

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-4 JUL 1967

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FCO TEL No 68 ADVICE TO Rhodesia

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 962 27 June 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 962 of 27 June, Repeated for information Saving to Amman, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Beirut, Jedda, Kuwait, Bahrain, Tripoli, Benghazi, Rabat, Algiers, Tunis, Khartoum, UKMIS New York and Washington.

Amended CRS 7/8

Your telegram No. ~~1179 [sic]~~ 1291 to Amman and UKMIS New York telegram No. ~~1183 [sic]~~ 1512 to you: Jerusalem.

Please see your telegram No. 1083 reporting Sir Denis Allen's conversation with the Iranian Ambassador in London on 13 June.

2. I believe that Mr. Aram's comments on Jerusalem accurately reflected the views of his Government. But he also pointed out that the Shah would be unwilling to take any sort of lead in working for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute. To this I would add the gloss that the Shah might be prepared to take a lead if he calculated he could do so without antagonising King Faisal and other "Right-Wing" Arab leaders.

3. His relations with these will probably be the first consideration for the Shah. I do not think we could count on public Iranian support for any internationalisation initiative taken by others if it were clear that all the Arabs were hostile to it. Moreover, there is one significant difference between the ideas outlined by Mr. Aram and those in your telegram under reference, in that Mr. Aram did not mention the fall-back position of internationalisation of the Old City only.

4. In the light of paragraph 1 of your telegram under reference and of UKMIS New York telegram under reference, I do not (repeat not) propose to raise this subject with the Iranian Foreign Minister unless you instruct me to do so, but will report if he volunteers anything on his return from New York.

Foreign Office pass Saving to Amman 5, Tel Aviv 3, Jerusalem 1, Beirut 14, Jedda 4, Kuwait 3, Bahrain 8, Tripoli 2, Benghazi 1, Rabat 2, Algiers 1, Khartoum 1, Tunis 1, UKMIS New York 4 and Washington 10.

[Check and repeat of references has been requested]

Sir D. Wright Sent 1133Z 27 June
Recd 1255Z 27 June

[Repeated as requested]

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SAVING TO Rabat

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- 4 JUL 1967

CYPHER/CAT A & BY BAG

FOREIGN OFFICE TO TEHRAN

TELNO 1200 27 JUNE, 1967 (EASTERN)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO TEHRAN TELEGRAM NUMBER 1200 OF 27 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO ANKARA, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, AMMAN, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV, BAHRAIN, MOSCOW AND PARIS AND SAVING TO RABAT, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, BEIRUT, ALGIERS, RAWALPINDI AND TRIPOLI.

MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 1083: IRAN, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST.

AT YOUR DISCRETION WE THINK THAT YOU SHOULD TELL THE SHAH THAT WE THINK THAT, AS A LEADING MIDDLE EAST POWER NOT INVOLVED IN THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE, IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL FOR HIM TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TURNS OUT, BUT IT SEEMS THAT FOR THE TIME BEING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REVOLUTIONARY ARAB COUNTRIES ARE CONCERNED PRIMARILY WITH PROPAGANDA AND ARE NOT IN THE MOOD FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS. WE MUST, THEREFORE, REGRETFULLY, LOOK FOR THOSE TO COME AT A LATER STAGE. AT THAT POINT IRAN MAY WELL HAVE A MOST VALUABLE AND INFLUENTIAL PART TO PLAY.

2. WE THEREFORE SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE MOMENT FOR THE SHAH TO STICK TO GENERALITIES IN ANY COMMUNICATION HE MAKES TO THE RUSSIANS, RATHER THAN TO ADVANCE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON WHICH A FIRM SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE MIGHT BE BASED. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT POINTS ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WOULD BE THE MOST HELPFUL:-

(A) IRAN DEPLORES TENSION AND WAR IN A REGION SO CLOSE TO HER BORDERS SEMICOLON

(B) IRANIANS ARE NATURALLY SYMPATHETIC TO THEIR FELLOW-MUSLIMS' POINT OF VIEW, BUT, LIKE THE RUSSIANS, ARE REALISTIC IN ACCEPTING THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AS A COUNTRY SEMICOLON

(C) IT CAN HARDLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION, OR THE OTHER GREAT POWERS, MUCH LESS THE PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR PALESTINE TO REMAIN AN EXPLOSIVE ISSUE SEMICOLON

(D) THE GREAT POWERS SHOULD THEREFORE SEEK TO REDUCE THE TENSION RATHER THAN TO EXACERBATE IT, SO AS TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD LAST. IT IS TIME TO DAMP DOWN PASSIONS, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF FRUITFUL NEGOTIATIONS, RATHER THAN TO ROUSE THEM.

SOSFA SENT 1015Z 28 JUNE

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INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
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Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A' [Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 162 D M

[Date] 27 June R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESS TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NO 162

GUIDANCE OF 27/6

ARAB/ISRAEL CRISIS: OIL.

THE PRESENT SUPPLY POSITION IS:

(A) EXPORTS FROM IRAQ ARE RESTRICTED TO SYRIA.
LEBANON. FRANCE AND TURKEY FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION.

THERE ARE NO EXPORTS FROM LIBYA BUT THERE
IS HOPE THAT THEY WILL BE RESUMED FAIRLY SOON.

(B) OIL IS FLOWING FROM ALL THE OTHER ARAB
PRODUCING STATES BUT WITH GOVERNMENTAL BANS ON
EXPORTS TO THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES.

IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES EXPORTS ARE BELOW THE
NORMAL LEVEL BECAUSE OF THE SHORTAGE OF TANKERS
ARISING FROM CLOSURE OF THE TRANSIT ROUTES (SEE
(C) BELOW).

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(C) THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE LEVANT PIPELINES FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAQ (EXCEPT FOR THE LOCAL SUPPLIES TO SYRIA AND LEBANON) ARE STILL CLOSED AND ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN SO FOR SOME TIME. (IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER EXPORTS OF IRAQ OIL TO FRANCE AND TURKEY WILL BE ALLOWED THROUGH THE SYRIAN PIPELINES).

(D) MEANWHILE, EXPORTS ARE BEING MAXIMISED, WITHIN CAPACITY LIMITS, FROM IRAN, VENEZUELA AND NIGERIA (WHERE THE INTERNAL POLIT- ICAL DIFFERENCES COULD, HOWEVER, AFFECT THE SMOOTH FLOW). AS REGARDS OIL SUPPLIES TO THE UNITED KINGDOM THE ARAB BAN ON EXPORTS TO US IS NOT AN INSUPERABLE PROBLEM SINCE WE CAN SWITCH TO NON-ARAB SOURCES, WITH DISPLACED ARAB OIL GOING ELSEWHERE.

2. THE SHORTAGE OF TANKERS, CAUSED BY THE LONGER HAULS NOW NECESSARY IS AFFECTING THE UNITED KINGDOM~S AND THE REST OF WESTERN EUROPE~S SUPPLIES IN TERMS NOT ONLY OF QUANTITIES BUT ALSO OF COSTS. STOCKS, WHICH IN MOST CASES (AND CERTAINLY IN THE UK) ARE HIGH, HAVE CUSHIO- NED THE EFFECTS OF THE SHORTFALL.

when Libyan

WHEN LIBYAN EXPORTS ARE RESUMED THE SITUATION WILL BE EASIER BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF LIBYA TO THE EUROPEAN MARKET. BUT THERE WILL BE A SUPPLY PROBLEM (OF DIMINI- SHING SEVERITY) SO LONG AS THE TRANSIT ROUTES, AND PARTICULARLY THE SUEZ CANAL, REMAIN CLOSED.

3. IT IS IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THIS SITUATION THAT THE INTER- NATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY SHOULD BE ABLE TO COOPERATE FULLY IN ORDER TO MAXIMISE WORLD SUPPLIES AND RATIONALISE DELIVERIES. A KEY FACTOR IS THE ABILITY OF THE US OIL COMPANIES TO COLLABORATE WITH THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL OIL INDUSTRY TO THESE ENDS. ANTI-TRUST LEGIS- LATION PREVENTS THEM IN NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES FROM DOING SO. ACTION IS NOW BEING TAKEN IN THE OECD AIMED AT AGREEING ON A FORMULA WHICH, WHILE AVOIDING AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE PROVOKING THE ARABS WOULD MEET THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRA- TION FOR THE NECESSARY WAIVER OF ANTI-TRUST REGULATION.

RUSSIAN OIL. 4. THERE HAS BEEN PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UK MIGHT IMPORT OIL FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE GOOD THE SHORT- FALL IN SUPPLIES. WE HAVE FOR SOME YEARS HAD AN EMBARGO ON THE IMPORT OF SOVIET CRUDE AND PRODUCTS (WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS). FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION ONLY. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO A LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. AT LEAST FOR CERTAIN PRODUCTS (E.G. NAPHTHA). HOWEVER. THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT SOVIET SUPPLIES WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. THE SOVIET MINISTER OF FOREIGN TRADE ON 19 JUNE DISMISSED PRESS REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD OFFERED OIL TO BRITAIN AS ~~SHEER FABRICATION~~ AND INTENDED TO SOUR SOVIET-ARAB FRIENDSHIP. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT. IN PRESENT CIRCUM- STANCES. BE PREPARED TO SELL MORE OIL TO THE UK.

GUIDANCE. 5. ALL THE ABOVE IS PRIMARILY FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION. WE DO NOT WISH TO STIMULATE COMMENT.

5. THE PRESENT SUPPLY SITUATION, WITH LIBYA NOT EXPORTING, IS POTENTIALLY SERIOUS, BUT WE MUST AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PERTURBED. AT THE SAME TIME WE WISH TO AVOID COMMENT WHICH MIGHT UNNECESSARILY HARDEN THE ATTITUDES OF THOSE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING STATES WHICH ARE SHOWING READINESS TO RETURN TO MORE OR LESS NORMAL CONDITIONS. WHERE COMMENT IS UNAVOIDABLE, YOU SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLO- WING LINE:

(A) WE REGRET OF COURSE THAT THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SHOULD HAVE FELT THEMSELVES CONSTRAINED TO TAKE THE ACTION THEY DID BECAUSE OF WHAT, AT ITS MILDEST, MIGHT BE TERMED A MISTAKE (SEE GUIDANCE NO. 156). — 1076

(B) NOW THAT IT HAS BECOME PATENTLY CLEAR TO EVERYBODY THAT WE WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, WE HOPE THAT THESE STATES WILL SOON LIFT THEIR VARIOUS BANS.

(C) WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PRESSURES WHICH OPERATED AT THE TIME ON THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED, BUT IT IS IN THEIR INTERESTS AT LEAST AS MUCH AS ANYBODY ELSE'S THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN EARLY RETURN TO NORMAL

6

NORMAL TRADING PATTERNS.

(D) MEANWHILE, OF COURSE, THE UK AND OTHER OIL-IMPORTING COUNTRIES ARE TAKING THE PRACTICAL ACTION NECESSARY TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED SUPPLY OF OIL PENDING THE RETURN TO NORMAL TRADING. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT THE EFFECT ON OUR SUPPLY POSITION OF THE BAN ON UK DESTINATIONS YOU SHOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE BAN IS HIGHLY OBJECTIONABLE. BUT THAT THOUGH IT IS INCONVENIENT IT IS OF LITTLE PRACTICAL EFFECT (SEE PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE). YOU SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, AVOID COMMENT ON THE SOVIET OIL POINT. IF PRESSED YOU SHOULD MERELY ~~SAYY~~ SAY THAT THE POSITION MIGHT BE EXPECTED TO BE UNDER REVIEW.

SOSFA

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(96359) Wt.13880—33
5/62 St.S.

Minutes 1076

Mr Brown's pronouncements on the Middle East

A Yesterday afternoon at the Anglo Israel Arabic Lecture, Mr. Bamieh, Editor of the Arabic Service, gave [me] a very clear picture of reactions in the F of S's M&P circles to [Mr. Brown's] recent pronouncements.

2. [The Foreign Secretary's] address to the United Nations on 21 June had been welcomed with jubilation. It was regarded as far and away the most constructive & unequivocal Statement heard at the Assembly.

3. When [Mr Marshall] found them stronger they were no longer in a state of jubilation but one of sobbing remorse. On top of [what they described as a weak vacillating performance in the Commons, Mr. Brown had, they said, put up a very poor show indeed on Television [F.O. Tel 347 of 27 June below]. Just when they had found new hope it had been stamped at birth. B

J Tomkinson
28 June 1967

HE Thank you. See draft
AES 27.VI
28/VI

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(96359) Wt. 13880—33
5/62 St.S.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Minutes 1076

Moroccan Troops and the Middle East War

1. Apart from the political factors which may have led Nasser to prevent the Moroccan air contingent from taking part in the fighting and the same feeling which stopped the rail party at the Algerian border, there are valid military reasons why General Bachir as the commander of the force would not have wanted to commit the the air contingent to battle by itself. Firstly they had no artillery or antitank weapons of their own and the infantry would have suffered enormous casualties against Israeli tanks in the open country of the Sinai desert. Secondly, because of the basic antipathy between Moroccan and Egyptian military leaders following Egyptian support for Algeria in 1963, the Moroccan commander would view with suspicion an Egyptian offer to provide field and antitank artillery support, since it might never materialise.

2. The coordination of different national forces into a single command requires much study and practice if it is to be effective; our experience with NATO forces in Germany and elsewhere confirms this. Unless there is a period for the working out of common staff procedures, communication systems and logistics, to name only a few of the problems, effective cooperation in modern warfare is impossible. The fact that there were no military talks between Morocco and Egypt before troops were despatched lends weight to the argument that Nasser had every intention of defeating the Israelis without King Hassan's help.

H E

28th June 1967

Lieut Colonel
Defence Attaché

X

X is surely one of the chief reasons (next to the Israeli air strike) why the Arabs were defeated

I entirely agree. AJM 29/6.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

28/VI

1076

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

28 June, 1967.

PERSONAL:

For what it is worth, I think I should let you know that when Marshall happened to be round on 27 June at the Maghreb Arabe Presse, M. Bamieh, Editor of the Arabic Service, gave him a very clear picture of reactions in M.A.P. circles to the Secretary of State's recent pronouncements.

2. Mr. Brown's address to the United Nations on 21 June had been welcomed with jubilation. It was regarded as far and away the most constructive and unequivocal statement heard at the Assembly.

3. When Marshall found them though they were no longer in a state of jubilation but one of sobbing remorse. On top of what they described as a weak vacillating performance in the Commons, Mr. Brown had, they said, put up a very poor show indeed on Television. Just when they had found new hope it had been strangled at birth.

4. There are bound to be these ups and downs and we can hardly expect M.A.P. staff to understand the Secretary of State's remark that in his job "You have to accept that you are almost certain to disturb somebody." The incident may nevertheless indicate what high hopes are placed on us here.

(L. G. Holliday)

D. J. Speares, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

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[Date]

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FROM FO TO RABAT

GUIDANCE

No. 164

28 June

D M

R M

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ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TELEGRAM NUMBER GUIDANCE 164 OF 28 JUNE. ARAB-ISRAEL. THE FLIGHT RECORDS OF ROYAL NAVY AND R.A.F. AIRCRAFT DURING THE RECENT ARAB-ISRAEL WAR HAVE NOW BEEN PLACED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY.

2. THEY REVEAL A NUMBER OF FACTS WHICH COULD BE MANIPULATED TO REVIVE THE BIG LIE STORIES. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAIN EXAMPLES:

(1) H.M.S. VICTORIOUS WAS NOT ACTUALLY IN HARBOUR AT MALTA WHEN THE FIRST ISRAELI AIR STRIKES WERE TAKING PLACE. HER LOGS THEREFORE DO NOT BEAR OUT LORD CARADON~S STATEMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS THAT BOTH CARRIERS WERE STATIONARY IN HARBOUR AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACKS AND HIS IMPLICATION THAT R.N. AIRCRAFT COULD NOT HAVE TAKEN PART BECAUSE AIRCRAFT CANNOT TAKE OFF FROM A STATIONARY CARRIER.

(1) Answers

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

(III) ANSWERS:

(A) THE SHIPS LOG VERIFIES THAT THE VICTORIOUS PUT INTO MALTA HARBOUR AT 0900 HOURS ON 5 JUNE AND THAT SHE WAS CLOSE TO MALTA THROUGHOUT THE TIME SHE WAS AT SEA DURING 4 AND 5 JUNE.

(B) NO AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN HELICOPTERS TOOK OFF FROM H.M.S. VICTORIOUS AFTER 1500 HOURS ON 4 JUNE: A NIGHT FLYING EXERCISE WHICH HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR 4 JUNE WAS CANCELLED OWING TO A DEFECTIVE RADAR AND BAD WEATHER OVER THE DIVERSIONARY AIRFIELD.

(II) H.M.S. HERMES WAS IN ADEN HARBOUR DURING 4 AND 5 JUNE BUT:

(A) SHE WAS AT SEA ON 5 JUNE AND

(B) TWO OF HER BUCCANEERS WERE OPERATING FROM KHORMAKSAR ON MONDAY, 5 JUNE.

ANSWER THE LOGS REVEAL THAT NONE OF THE FLIGHTS DURING THIS PERIOD WAS LONG ENOUGH TO ENABLE AN AIRCRAFT TO REACH EGYPT OR ISRAEL.

(III) THE LOGS FOR BOTH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS SHOW THAT THE PRACTICE OF IN-FLIGHT REFUELLING IS USED. AND THAT THEORETICALLY BY THIS MEANS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR ANY STRIKE AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM THE CARRIERS TO HAVE REACHED THE BATTLE AREA.

(This

(THIS POINT DOES CONFLICT WITH OUR OFFICIAL ASSURANCES THAT THE AIRCRAFT NOT ONLY DID NOT BUT COULD NOT REACH THE BATTLE AREA).

ANSWER THE LOGS DEMONSTRATE HOWEVER THAT NO SUCH FLIGHTS TOOK PLACE.

(IV) CANBERRA FLIGHTS FROM AKROTIRI. THERE WERE ALTOGETHER 63 CANBERRA FLIGHTS DURING THE PERIOD OF SUFFICIENT DURATION TO HAVE ALLOWED THE AIRCRAFT TO REACH THE BATTLE AREA AT LEAST ON THE SYRIAN FRONT.

ANSWER THE DOCUMENTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT THE AIRCRAFT WERE ON ROUTINE TRAIN- ING TASKS NOWHERE NEAR THE BATTLE AREA, AND IN SOME CASES WERE LOADED WITH SMALL NUMBERS OF 25 POUND PRACTICE BOMBS.

(V) A SINGLE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CANBERRA FROM THE SQUADRON AT LUQA IN MALTA WAS ON A ROUTINE ATTACHMENT TO MUHARRAQ. THE DOCUMENTS RECORD THAT A PHOTO RECCE AIRCRAFT WAS FLYING ON MISSIONS LABELLED ~~TASK 703~~ AND ~~TASK 704~~ ON 5 AND 6 JUNE. ANSWER THESE TASKS WERE IN FACT TO PHOTOGRAPH DISUSED AIRFIELDS IN MUSCAT.

in Bahrain

(vi) One sel-

(VI) ONE SET OF DOCUMENTS COVERS ~~OPERATION HYDRAULIC~~. THIS WAS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF NO. 74 LIGHTNING SQUADRON TO THE FAR EAST. AS PART OF THIS OPERATION A NUMBER OF VICTOR TANKER AIRCRAFT FOR RE- FUELLING THE LIGHTNINGS WERE PASSING THROUGH AKROTIRI ON THE DAYS IN QUESTION. ANSWER THE DOCUMENTATION SHOWS THAT THE VICTORS WERE BEING USED AS TANKER AIRCRAFT AND NOT BOMBERS. REVEALS THE COMPLICATED NATURE OF THE RE,- FUELLING OPERATION. AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN A BLIND.

(VII) EXERCISE ~~SUNSPOT~~ WAS IN PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD IN QUESTION. THIS IS AN EXERCISE WHICH IS REGULARLY HELD TWICE A YEAR. MAKING USE OF THE TRAINING FACILITIES WE ENJOY BY TREATY WITH THE LIBYAN GOVT. AND INVOLVES THE DEPLOYMENT OF VULCAN BOMBER AIRCRAFT TO LUQA. FOR THE PURPOSE OF PRACTISING LOW-LEVEL FLYING OVER THE LIBYAN DESERT AND BOMBING ON THE EL ADEM RANGE. SIX SORTIES IN ALL TOOK PLACE ON 5 AND 6 JUNE AND NONE ON 7 JUNE. ANSWER THERE

was good

WAS GOOD REASON AND PRECEDENT FOR THE PRESENCE OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN MALTA AND FOR THEIR EXERCISE WHICH HAD BEEN ARRANGED LONG IN ADVANCE.

3. THE FACT THAT THE DOCUMENTS DO CONTAIN SUCH FULL DETAILS SOME OF WHICH MIGHT BE THOUGHT BY THE ILL-DISPOSED TO REQUIRE EXPLANATION IS ITSELF EVIDENCE OF THEIR GENUINE NATURE.

4. THE ABOVE IS A PURELY DEFENSIVE BRIEF FOR DEALING WITH ANY NEW STORIES ARISING FROM THE DOCUMENTS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THESE WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TO ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS AND SERVICE ATTACHES. BUT NO POSITIVE PUBLICITY IS BEING ARRANGED.

SOSFA

I have asked A.O.S. to look out for this.

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/OTP

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FO TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 351 D M

[Date] 28 June R M

Repeated to

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HE [illegible] (O.S.)
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CONFIDENTIAL.

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM JERUSALEM. ADDRESSED TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 252 OF 28 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN. TEL AVIV. BEIRUT. JEDDA. KUWAIT. BAHRAIN. TRIPOLI. BENGHAZI. RABAT. ALGIERS. TUNIS. UKMIS NEW YORK. WASHINGTON. PARIS. ROME. HOLY SEE AND MOSCOW.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1291 TO AMMAN.

3361 RABAT
1076/67.

DISTRIBUTION

JERUSALEM.

UNDER ENABLING LAWS PASSED YESTERDAY THE OLD CITY IS NOW BEING PLACED UNDER ISRAELI CIVIL ADMINISTRATION JOINTLY WITH THE NEW. THIS PROCESS WILL TAKE A FEW DAYS. BUT THE FORMER ARAB MAYOR CEASES TO FUNCTION FROM TODAY. MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO CITIES REMAINS RESTRICTED FOR THE PRESENT. THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT CONSOLIDATION OF DE FACTO CONTROL WITHOUT FORMAL

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

annexation

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ANNEXATION. THE WEST BANK REMAINS UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

2. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE ARAB OPINION HERE IN THE SHOCK OF DEFEAT AND OCCUPATION AND THE ABSENCE OF NORMAL COMMUNICATIONS AND SOCIAL LIFE. SOME STILL HANKER FOR RESTORATION OF JORDANIAN SOVEREIGNTY SEMICOLON OTHERS WOULD PREFER INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE OLD CITY AND HOLY PLACES (AND SOME FORM OF GUARANTEED AUTONOMY FOR WEST BANK) BUT FEW WOULD REGARD INTERNATIONALIZATION OF A UNITED CITY AS A PRACTICAL POSSIBILITY. A DECLARATION IN FAVOUR OF INTERNATIONALIZATION MIGHT BE WELCOMED BY A SUBSTANTIAL BODY OF OPINION (SEE MY PREDECESSOR~S TELEGRAM NUMBER 235 NOT TO ALL). BUT I DOUBT IF WE SHOULD GAIN MUCH BY MAKING IT. F.O. PASS RABAT UNNUMBERED.

SOSFA

Nkl.ws.

Robat 1076
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BY BAG

FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 163 28 JUNE 1967 (IPG)

UNCLASSIFIED

1076/6 1076/67

Guidance Nos. 132 and 137 (not to all)

Middle East: Allegations of British military involvements

King Hussein was interviewed in New York by Pauline Frederick on NBC's "Today Show" on 27 June. The following is transcript of passage dealing with alleged Western military intervention.

Begins.

Frederick: "Your Majesty, do you have any evidence that the United States and/or the United Kingdom were involved, either directly or indirectly, in this war?"

King Hussein: "No, we have no evidence whatsoever, and I've heard a great deal of comments on suspicions that we had a telephone conversation that was unfortunately not complete that was broadcast by the Israelis that was supposed to have taken place between me and President Nasser at a certain point.

"There were some indications, we had some radar sightings of aircraft that were appearing from the sea. We faced a tremendous and overwhelming enemy air force that covered all the skies of Jordan. Suddenly the West Bank and everything got moved.

"There were some wrong identifications of aircraft, and we did not know that this was possible radar (?). Our radar was destroyed soon. Many of the things that we had seen were explained later. For example, these aircraft that we had sighted on radar apparently were Israeli aircraft returning from their attacks on the United Arab Republic, which they carried out at low level, and on the way back they were climbing. And that's when we spotted them.

"We have said that we have no physical or definite proof that there was any intervention by Britain or America. And what we really wanted to know was the truth of exactly what happened, because that is so important for us to know it, so that we can move ahead in the future".

ENDS.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 4 JUL 1967

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TELEX ◇ SERVICE

1076

Too late?

OK GA GA

CIRCULAR RETRACT 89228

ITEM. NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF BRITISH INTERVENTION SAYS HUSSEIN.

FROM LPS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT EERYK JAMES , NEW YORK,
WEDNESDAY.

KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN HAS SAID ON TELEVISION HERE THAT HE HAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER THAT BRITAIN OR THE UNITED STATES WERE INVOLVED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST WAR.

HE WAS BEING INTERVIEWED IN THE NBC PROGRAMME ''TODAY SHOW.''

THE INTERVIEWER, PAULINE FREDERICK, ASKED THE KING:

''YOUR MAJESTY, DO YOU HAVE ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND/OR THE UNITED KINGDOM WERE INVOLVED, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, IN THIS WAR?''

KING HUSSEIN REPLIED: ''NO. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER.''

HE WENT ON TO TALK OF WHAT HAD BEEN SEEN ON JORDAN RADAR.

''WE HAD SOME RADAR SIGHTINGS OF AIRCRAFT THAT WERE APPEARING FROM THE SEA,'' HE SAID. ''WE FACED A TREMENDOUS AND OVERWHELMING ENEMY AIR FORCE THAT COVERED ALL THE SKIES OF JORDAN... THERE WERE SOME WRONG IDENTIFICATIONS OF AIRCRAFT.''

KING HUSSEIN ADDED THAT THE RADAR HAD SOON BEEN DESTROYED.

ISRAELI AIRCRAFT.

KING HUSSEIN CONTINUED: ''MANY OF THE THINGS WE HAD SEEN WERE EXPLAINED LATER. FOR EXAMPLE, THESE AIRCRAFT THAT WE HAD SIGHTED ON RADAR APPARENTLY WERE ISRAELI AIRCRAFT RETURNING FROM THEIR ATTACKS ON THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, WHICH THEY HAD CARRIED OUT AT LOW LEVEL, AND ON THE WAY BACK WERE CLIMBING.

''AND THAT IS WHEN WE SPOTTED THEM,'' HE ADDED.

SENT 1728/28/JRB
PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

CONFIDENTIAL

1076

Foreign Office/
Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

(IPG 12/1/128/2)

28 June, 1967

Dear Arthur,

The "Big Lie"

I am sorry to see from your letter (1076/67) of 22 June that you feel that your requirements in combating the allegations in "al Anba" of 13 June were not fully appreciated.

2. When we received your telegram No. 240 we examined the "Observer" of 11 June most carefully. Nowhere (including the article by Patrick Seale) could we find anything which could be identified with the wording you gave. In our telegram No. 280 we confined ourselves to specifying the editorial because it is only the editorial that can fairly be quoted as an expression of a newspaper's opinion. Certainly the Patrick Seale article could not be so quoted.

3. At any time the British press provides a gold mine of quotes to be used by our enemies, straight or distorted, to suit their own purposes. It is not possible to keep track of all the possibilities. In providing posts with full general guidance we hope that Information Officers will be able to use it in conjunction with their own knowledge of events to field such problems as that posed by the "al Anba" allegation.

4. In the case of the "al Anba" allegation we thought it reasonable that, basing yourself upon the guidance material we were sending and upon the news you must have been getting on the B.B.C., you could have taken the line that, while (deplorably) the "Observer" of 11 June was not available in Rabat any allegations of collusion between Britain and Israel, whatever the source, were known to be completely without foundation. While our interests in the Middle East had been harmed by these allegations this did not detract from the fact that they were lies. Specific guidance really did not enter into the question; general guidance and common knowledge enabled anypost to deny the collusion charge and to agree on damage (for whatever reason) to our interests. This was sufficient to rebut "al Anba" immediately; on the strength of our telegram it was further possible to deny the quote itself because I still think that the Seale quote does not add up to "British collusion".

Yours ever,
Brian Pridham

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
- 4 JUL 1967

(B. R. Pridham)
Joint Information Policy and
Guidance Department

A. S. M. Marshall, Esq.,
" Rabat.

mpp 1076

FOREIGN OFFICE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

PERSONAL

28 June, 1967.

My dear Ambassador,

Denis Speares, who is snatching a few days leave after some very busy weeks, has asked me to thank you for your personal letter of 20 June to him, in which you described the writing of your Despatch No. 12 of the same date.

2. We are most grateful for this lucid description of the recent crisis as seen from Morocco and we are sending it for printing. In the meantime, please don't imagine that we expect from you or your staff any more than you have been providing us with in recent weeks. Indeed, we are acutely conscious that in the recent crisis we could not cope properly with everything we received from you and other posts. Certainly I myself find I need plenty of time off if I am to make any sense in the office. I was glad to get a full week-end off last week-end; I went fishing and I did manage to catch two respectable trout and five grayling, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the usual summer downpour.

What this means is that they would like us!

Yours sincerely,

Philip Mallet

L. G. Holliday, Esq., (P. L. V. Mallet)
C.M.G.,
RABAT.

SERVICE TELEX ◇

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CENTROFORM LDN

1076

VERBATIM SERVICE 303/67 29TH JUNE 1967.

MIDDLE EAST: STRAITS OF TIRAN AND ISLAND OF PERIM.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REPLY BY PRIME MINISTER AND SUPPLEMENTARIES IN HOUSE OF COMMONS JUNE 29:

WAS STILL THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY TO ASSERT THE RIGHT OF ALL BRITISH SHIPPING TO USE THE STRAIT OF TIRAN AS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY: AND WHETHER THE SAME POLICY APPLIED TO THE SUEZ CANAL.

VISCOUNT LAMBTON ASKED MR. WILSON IF HE WOULD MAKE A STATEMENT OUTLINING HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT POLICY TOWARDS THE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

THE PRIME MINISTER: WITH PERMISSION, I WILL ANSWER THIS QUESTION AND QUESTION NUMBER 10 TOGETHER.

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT CONTINUE TO AFFIRM THE RIGHTS OF PASSAGE OF SHIPPING OF ALL STATES IN BOTH THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

SIR RICHARD GLYN: WILL THE PRIME MINISTER SAY WHAT PLAN HE HAD TO ENFORCE THESE UNQUESTIONED RIGHTS WHICH HE ANNOUNCED AS BRITAIN'S POLICY, AS REPORTED IN THE PRESS ON 25 H MAY, AND CAN THIS SAME PLAN WHICH HE HAD IN MIND THEN BE EXTENDED TO APPLY TO OUR RIGHT OVER THE SUEZ CANAL NOW?

TELEX ◇ SERVICE

THE PRIME MINISTER: THE STATEMENT MADE ON 24TH MAY REFERRED TO A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH, IT SEEMED TO MOST OF US IN THE HOUSE WHEN WE DEBATED IT, MIGHT LEAD TO WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. [redacted]E SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ASSERT FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AS A WAY OF AVOIDING THAT WAR. IT WAS NOT AVOIDED AND IT MUST OBVIOUSLY BE ONE OF THE QUESTIONS IN THE SETTLEMENT.

WITH REGARD TO THE SUEZ CANAL, I HAVE NOTHING TO ADD TO WHAY MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND SAID TWO DAYS AGO. THE HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN WILL RECOGNISE THAT THE CLOSURE OF THE CANAL, WHICH WE ALL DEEPLY DEPLORE, PARTICULARLY THE SINKING OF THE SHIPS IN THE CANAL, IS A MATTER WHICH IS AWAITING SOME EASEMENT FROM THE UNITED NATIONS DISCUSSIONS. I AM SURE THAT THE HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN WILL BE THE FIRST TO AGREE THAT BRITAIN CANNOT SHOOT HER WAY TO OPEN UP THE CANAL. THE LAST TIME THIS WAS TRIED IT CLOSED IT FOR SIX MONTHS.

VISCOUNT LAMBTON: WOULD NOT THE PRIME MINISTER AGREE THAT THE WAR BROKE OUT BECAUSE THE PRIME MINISTER, HAVING ORIGINALLY SAID HAT HE WOULD ASSERT THE FREEDOM OF THE CANAL - (INTERRUPTION.) - FREEDOM OF THE GULF OF AQABA, THEN DID NOTHING AND MADE ISRAEL GO IT ALONE?

HE PRIME MINISTER: THIS IS COMPLETELY WRONG. IT IS A TREMENDOUS FLIGHT OF FANCY TO SUGGEST THAT THE FIGHTING BEGAN IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE OF ANY ACTION TAKEN OR NOT TAKEN BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT OR BY ME PERSONALLY. AS THE HONOURABLE GENTLEMAN WILL KNOW, WE WERE IN THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WHAT COULD BE DONE BY THE MARITIME POWERS TO ASSERT THE FREEDOM OF THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. BOTH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND WE OURSELVES URGED THE UTMOST RESTRAINT ON ALL THE PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNTIL MATTERS OF THIS KIND COULD BE DECIDED PEACEFULLY. UNFORTUNATELY, THE FIGHTING BROKE OUT.

SERVICE TELEX

MR. RAPHAEL TUCK: WOULD HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE THE RIGHT OF FREEDOM THROUGH THE CANAL AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN IN CONCERT WITH OTHER POWERS IN THE FUTURE?

THE PRIME MINISTER: THIS MUST BE A MATTER FOR THE ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT. I THINK PRACTICALLY EVERYONE WHO HAS SPOKEN ON THIS MATTER HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN MUST BE PART OF AN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS ON THE LAST OCCASION IN 1957 AND CERTAIN ASSURANCES WERE GIVEN TO ISRAEL AT THE TIME. ALL THE MARITIME NATIONS, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, FULLY ENDORSED FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN: BUT, AS WE KNOW, SHARM EL SHEIK WAS OCCUPIED AND THE MATTER WAS REOPENED. EVERYONE MUST AGREE THAT THIS MUST BE SETTLED AS PART OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT.

LORD BALNIEL: WOULD THE PRIME MINISTER TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY OUR SUGGESTION THAT LAST NIGHT THAT THE ISLAND OF PERIM WHICH DOMINATES THE OTHER ENTRANCE TO THE RED SEA SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP WHEN WE RELINQUISH SOVEREIGNTY, BECAUSE IS THERE NOT A REAL DANGER THAT THE FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO THE RED SEA WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED FOR 100 YEARS BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT COULD CEASE AND THAT, IN PARTICULAR, ISRAELI SHIPPING COULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE RED SEA ALTOGETHER?

THE PRIME MINISTER: AS THE NOBLE LORD KNOWS, MY RIGHT HONOURABLE FRIEND, IN WINDING UP THE DEBATE ON THAT PART OF THE BILL, ENDORSED THE NOBLE LORD'S PROPOSAL AND SAID THAT WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO GET IT UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION.

ENDS VS 303/67.

PRODROME RABAT

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PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

1076

VERBATIM SERVICE 304/67 29TH JUNE 1967.

OIL SUPPLIES AND COSTS.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF A STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF POWER MR. RICHARD MARSH, IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JUNE 29, WITH EXTRACT FROM SUPPLEMENTARY REPLIES.

TEMPORARILY THE COST OF OIL SUPPLIES FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, AS FOR OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY AS A RESULT, PRINCIPALLY, OF THE LENGTHENING OF TANKER ROUTES AND HIGHER TANKER FREIGHT RATES.

THESE COSTS HAVE TO BE MET IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR SUPPLIES.

THEY REPRESENT, BROADLY, AN AVERAGE OF TWO POUNDS STERLING A TON.

THE OIL COMPANIES HAVE CONSULTED ME IN DETAIL ABOUT THE POSITION AND HAVE SOUGHT MY ADVICE ON HOW TO HANDLE THE INCREASED COSTS.

THE GOVERNMENT HAVE ACCEPTED THAT A TEMPORARY SURCHARGE OF TWOPENCE A GALLON ON THE PRICE OF ALL PETROL PRODUCTS WOULD BE REASONABLE TO MEET THE COSTS OF THE PRESENT SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES.

I SHALL KEEP THE WHOLE SITUATION UNDER CLOSE REVIEW.
(ENDS STATEMENT).

MR. MARSH: ..... GOVERNMENTAL CALCULATIONS HAVE CLEARLY TAKEN PLACE OF THE EFFECT ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ..... RATIONING IS CERTAINLY VERY MUCH UNDER CONSIDERATION. I WORK ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IT IS EASIER NOT TO USE RATIONING IF ONE FINDS THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY, THAN TO FIND AT THE VERY LAST MOMENT THAT ONE IS UNPREPARED AND THEN HAVE TO USE IT. I SEE NO PROSPECT OF RATIONING IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE BUT PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE SO THAT AT SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE, THAT WE CANNOT SEE, WE SHALL BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH IT .....

ENDS VS 304/67.

PRODROME RABAT

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

Cypher/CAT A

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. 352 D M

[Date] 29 June R M

Repeated to

[Priority]

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM KHARTOUM.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 322 OF

29 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW

YORK WASHINGTON BEIRUT JEDDA TRIPOLI ALGIERS

RABAT KUWAIT BAHRAIN AND AMMAN.

YOUR GUIDANCE 158. -1076.

DISTRIBUTION

IT IS STILL NECESSARY HERE TO HAMMER AWAY AT

THE BIG LIE WITH ALL THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE.

MOST SUDANESE IN RESPONSIBLE POSITIONS NOW

DISCOUNT IT. BUT THE MAJORITY HAVE LINGERING

DOUBTS: EVEN THE ~DEMENTI~ IN KING HUSSEIN~S

PRESS CONFERENCE. WHICH WAS REPORTED OVER

OMDURMAN RADIO AND IN THE NEWSPAPERS. HAS

MADE ONLY A LIMITED IMPRESSION. THE FACT IS THAT

THE VAST MAJORITY STILL NEED TO BELIEVE THAT

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

Israel

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ISRAEL WAS AIDED IN ~~(UNDERLINE NEXT WORD)~~ SOME WAY BY THE U.S. AND POSSIBLY THE U.K. AND THERE IS A LIMIT TO WHAT WE OURSELVES CAN SAY WHICH WILL CONVINCE THEM OF THE CONTRARY.

2. AS SEEN FROM HERE THEREFORE A U.N. INVESTIGATION WOULD STILL BE ENORMOUSLY USEFUL TO PREVENT THE BIG LIE PASSING INTO UNSHAKEABLE ARAB MYTHOLOGY.

FURTHER MORE IT COULD PROVIDE JUST THE RIGHT EVIDENCE TO ENABLE US TO DESTROY THE BASIS ON WHICH THE SUDANESE HAVE BROKEN RELATIONS AT A MORE PROPITIOUS TIME: THEY WILL NEED JUST SUCH A LADDER TO CLIMB DOWN.

F.O. PASS RABAT U/N SOSFA.

No. (1091/67)

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv presents his compliments to H.M. Rep. Rabat and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British....Embassy,.....
TEL AVIV.
.....
.....

29 June, 1965.

Reference to previous correspondence :

Description of Enclosure

Name and Date.	Subject.
Tel Aviv Despatch No. 18	The Second Arab/Israel War, 1967. See above

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.

Despatch No. 18

(1091/67)

29 June, 1967.

The Second Arab-Israel War, 1967
The Preliminaries

S U M M A R Y

1. Paragraphs 1 & 2 This is an impressionistic despatch which tries to get through the mass of paper of a fortnight which only shows how wrong I was.

2. Paragraph 3 The trouble with Syria which occupied us for the previous year and probably led up to what happened.

3. Paragraphs 4 & 5 The events up to the 23rd of May which should normally have led the Israelis to hit the Egyptians then.

4. Paragraphs 6, 7 & 8 The international preoccupation with the question of the Straits of Tiran, what was going on inside Israel and how we again stopped the Israelis going.

5. Paragraph 9 The vital importance to either side of the first strike.

6. Paragraphs 10 & 12 Again internal politics and the growth of the problem.

7. Paragraph 11 (sic) Why the Jordanian behaviour really counted.

8. Paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 The moment of truth.

9. Paragraph 16 A rather feeble apologia and some hindsight.

P.S. I realise that this despatch contains what may be considered to be criticisms of "Intelligence appreciations". I would like to stress that I am in no way pointing at any British organisation. I am talking about them, the Israelis and very largely this Embassy and myself.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.
29 June, 1967.

Despatch No. 18
(1091/67)

Sir,

The Second Arab-Israel War, 1967
The Preliminaries

On the fourth of June I reported with some confidence that the Israel Government, for a variety of reasons, appeared to have accepted that for the foreseeable future there was no alternative to maintaining a passive posture (albeit with the maximum state of military readiness possible) in the face of Nasser's seizure of the initiative against them. Next day they embarked on one of the most ruthlessly efficient military campaigns in modern history, in the course of which they shattered the numerically superior forces of a coalition of Arab states, which had, as in 1948-49, combined against them. At the end of just over five days they had occupied the whole of Sinai: their troops were paddling in the Suez Canal: they had opened the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping: they were in occupation of enough of Syria to ensure that their settlements in Northern Galilee were no longer under the 19 year old threat of Syrian guns on the heights abcve: they had occupied the entire West Bank of Jordan: and, most miraculous of all, had won the unsought for prize of Old Jerusalem, thus realising the two thousand year old Jewish dream of the recovery of Zion, the City of David.

2. In the course of this despatch I have the honour, with the advantage of hindsight and with some humility in view of my lack of foresight, to give some picture of what led up to these shattering happenings. For over two weeks before the 5th of June, I had been reporting daily, sometimes even hourly, the course of events here. It is not therefore my intention to

/try

The Right Honourable George A. Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,
Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

try and recapitulate all that happened - there are already so many trees to be counted that one is liable to lose sight of the wood itself. All I can do is to read once more through the mass of telegrams, minutes and reports, then close them, forget them and, after a pause, set down in a highly impressionistic way what is left in my mind of the general trends which led to these cataclysmic (from a Middle Eastern point of view) events.

3. For the last year we seemed to have been occupied mainly with the threat to Middle East peace posed by the Israel/Syria situation. There were countless incidents attributable to the new Syrian doctrine of waging a continual proxy war against Israel. The Government of Mr. Eshkol, because of their fear of the Soviet Union, were extremely chary of yielding to popular demand to teach the Syrians a good lesson once and for all. This Government attitude gave rise to the totally irrelevant aberration of the Samua raid (which nevertheless may have had its lasting and traumatic effect on the subsequent peculiar behaviour of King Hussein). Even the total incompetence of the Syrian Air Force as illustrated on the 7th of April and the failure of any Soviet reaction did little to remove general Government fears about the Soviet/Syrian threat. Indeed, if one is to try to pinpoint any single event which started off the whole train ending with the cease fire of the 10th of June, it is perhaps Mr. Eshkol's speech of the 13th of May. I am sure this was intended as a deterrent measure, lest customary terrorist activities over the Independence Day celebrations might once again renew unwelcome pressures on Mr. Eshkol to allow a fairly large punitive operation. It succeeded in its short term object, but it resulted in the activation of the Syrian/Egyptian Defence Pact, the Syrian accusation of large Israel troop concentrations on her borders (supported for mysterious reasons vis a vis the Egyptians by Soviet sources) and the decision of the Egyptians to move considerable forces into Sinai with the maximum propaganda.

4. There follows what I would call the period of "Overtaken Intelligence Appreciations". The Israelis agreed with us that Nasser's new posture posed no real threat and was done for propaganda purposes only.

/They

They were even anxious lest King Hussein's constant needling of Nasser on the subject of UNEF and the Straits of Tiran might push him into actions he would otherwise not take. But events were rolling with their own momentum. Appreciations were only made to be overtaken by events. Would or could the Secretary-General of the United Nations allow UNEF forces to be pushed out? He had. As he explained privately to us later, he was motivated by fears for the safety of his forces at the hands of the Egyptians. But all that was heard from him in public at the time was a complaint of one incident involving the buzzing of a United Nations 'plane by the Israelis. Then there were doubts whether UNEF were actually being forced to evacuate Sharm el Sheikh, followed by speculation whether Nasser would actually occupy the point himself. The next questions were whether, having occupied it, he would announce the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping and then whether, having announced the closure, he was really going to do anything about it. In all these cases preliminary assessments were unduly optimistic. By this time the Israelis had begun to realise that they and indeed most of the world had been caught flat-footed either, as Israel's Western friends seemed to think, as the result of an unforeseen chain of events, or, as the Israel Intelligence began to suspect, as the result of a carefully thought out plan. It had always been one of the beliefs of your Department, Sir, and in this Embassy that the closure of the Straits of Tiran was likely to be an immediate casus belli and now the Israelis were suddenly faced with the actual situation. What would they do about it?

5. However optimistic had been the various Intelligence appreciations of what was really going on, the Israelis and indeed other responsible governments took pre-cautionary steps. As early as the 18th of May there was a limited call-up in Israel of certain specialised and technical categories as the result of Egyptian moves into Sinai. The withdrawal of UNEF led to a much more extensive mobilisation on the night of the 20th of May. As it became apparent that the occupation of Sharm el Sheikh might well lead to hostilities, the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government issued warnings to casual visitors to the Middle East to leave. By the afternoon of the 23rd of May it was clear that quiet but nevertheless much increased

/mobilisation

mobilisation measures were being put into force and from all the indications I had from various sources, both then and subsequently, an attack on Egypt was planned to take place at first light on the 24th of May. Meanwhile, however, heavy American pressure to leave it to the United States and to other powers to secure the opening of the Straits had had its effect on the Government and it was decided not to fight but to send Mr. Eban to the United States to probe these possibilities further. My own instructions arrived after the Government decision had been taken, but there is no doubt that the news of the Prime Minister's intended Mansion speech served a useful purpose in convincing the Israel Government that the United States was not alone in realising the gravity of the situation and in being prepared to do something about it.

6. We had got over one hump and another situation (in a series) had been created which made it politically difficult for the Israelis to take any action on their own. Although the possibility of some successful Syrian terrorist action still hung over us, the problem had become concentrated on the Straits of Tiran, to which all eyes were turned. There followed a considerable period when our main preoccupation was lest the Israelis might seek the desired showdown with Egypt by means of some small incident involving the passage of an Israel ship through the Straits, an Egyptian response and a massive Israel counter-response. The Israel Army and their highly efficient Intelligence services were, however, thinking about other matters. They observed the reinforcements and consolidation of the Egyptian tanks and aircraft in Sinai. They realised that in the event of a fight with Egypt it was inevitable that they would have to fight on a second front with Syria. They saw the "reasonable" Arabs like King Faisal and King Hussein becoming ensnared in the triumphant progress of the Nasserite bandwagon. They knew that the 23rd of May was about the last date on which they could have caught the Egyptians more or less unprepared and they saw the basic Israel advantages of surprise and the ability to mobilise and deploy rapidly becoming whittled away with each day that passed. They began to see that another situation was imperceptibly arising, which

/again

again the Foreign Office and this Embassy had always considered a possible casus belli: the effective united large scale build up of Arab armies designed to attack Israel. Morale among the public began to decline. The economic consequences of maintaining a large scale of mobilisation were beginning to be discussed. The diplomatic interlude merely served to increase the feelings in the Army of frustration and disillusionment with the political leadership. They still had no doubts about their abilities to take on all comers, but they felt that political delays were liable to increase military difficulties, casualties and the safety in war of the civil population. It is from this period that the demand began to be expressed for greater leadership and more decisiveness in the Government, which was to end in the appointment of General Dayan as Minister of Defence. Meanwhile we in this Embassy were busy watching the situation in the Straits of Tiran like a terrier at a rat hole.

7. The next hump was already visible. Would Mr. Eban bring back enough to satisfy the Israel Government that her interests in the Straits of Tiran could be preserved by other friendly powers and that Israel did not have to take unilateral action? In view of the feelings of the 200,000 or so voters in the Army, the gloomier Intelligence appreciations of the situation in the Arab world and the Government's own awareness of its growing unpopularity for inaction, it looked as if the decision was bound to be a fairly close run thing. On the assumption that Israel military action would have to take a surprise and preemptive form; becoming increasingly apprehensive that our appreciation that Nasser did not want a war and therefore would not move first himself might be becoming invalid; and knowing that once hostilities had started the air battle would close down possibilities for civil transport, I decided on the evacuation of dependents of this Embassy.

8. The crucial Cabinet meeting to hear Mr. Eban's case was on the 28th of May. My American colleague and I were using every argument we could to try and ensure the decision went the right way. In the event it did. In an interview I had with Mr. Allon, the Minister of Labour, immediately after the Cabinet decision, he seemed satisfied that the right course

/had

had been taken. But he gave me strong indications again that it was not really the question of the Straits of Tiran which was worrying the Israelis. It was the overall picture. Nasser was moving his armour in a way which suggested Eilat might be his target. He also stressed the importance of the air battle.

9. Since this latter must have played such a vital role in the final Israel decision to strike, perhaps I may be excused if I make some of the salient points which both we and the Israelis have all along had in mind. Israel has one of the most efficient air forces in the world, but it only has four main aerodromes off which to operate and these are in fairly close proximity to each other owing to the geographical formation of this tiny country. Israel also has a highly concentrate urban nexus placed square in the narrowest part of her territory - at one point only nine miles wide. The Arabs, and in particular the Egyptians, had numerically superior forces and the Egyptians had numerous and widely scattered air bases with most of their bombers (a commodity Israel does not possess) situated in air fields well to the south and near to the Sudanese border. The Israelis could possibly hope to match by superior skill the united Arab air forces in the air, but they would take severe losses and there was bound to be some penetration of the urban nexus by Egyptian bombers with resulting civilian hardship. It was therefore obvious that in the event of any type of hostilities with Egypt which went beyond a border clash, the Israelis would have to strike first at the Egyptian air fields in order to stop, completely if possible, the capability of the Egyptians to put their superior and more damaging air force into the air. The converse is equally true, that Israel simply could not afford to allow a first Egyptian strike against her limited air fields. We now know that Nasser was talking of forcing the Israelis into a war but insisting that they must strike first, as though the avoidance of "aggression" as Rule One in the United Nations Wisden were some sort of talisman which would bring ultimate salvation or victory. The fact that Nasser's approach made utter military nonsense in terms of modern warfare cannot really have been foreseen by the Israelis who must have assumed that the Egyptians, with their Russian advisers, must have had at least some rudimentary commonsense.

/Over

Over a year ago I advised your Department that my appreciation was that in the event of hostilities with Egypt the Israel air force would have to take action at D minus five minutes. In my conversation with Mr. Allon he fairly well confirmed this theory. As one journalist later put it to me, it was like the Western film where the more intelligent hero could not even afford to watch the gun hand of the fast-drawing villain, but watched his eyes for the flicker in them that would indicate that his gun hand was about to move.

10. Externally there followed the period of the steps to organise an International Maritime Declaration or, possibly even, Force. I myself had been rather surprised to gather from Mr. Eban that he thought this period might run into weeks. His estimation was certainly out of tune with what the Israel public felt and certainly what the Army felt. The very decision to go for a diplomatic solution had heightened the sense of frustration and put the Israel Intelligence services in a state of near despair as they hourly plotted the ascending graph of the Arab potential. Internally this meant that the Government finally had to give way to pressure to include General Dayan in the Cabinet, not only as a sop to the Army but as a sop to public opinion as a whole. It really made little difference to overall Government policy, but just as Nasser had to seek his talismans in concepts of the United Nations Charter, so too did the Israel public and Army have to have its one-eyed (and far from yellow) idol. It is perhaps typical of Israel political life thatthis event could not come about without the most agonising contortions among the parties and the political machine as a whole.

11. King Hussein's sudden rush to Cairo, his embrace of Nasser and the certainty that Jordan would now in some way become involved in the fight, caused no major public flutter. Once again the feeling was that this was something that had to happen, it was largely political and it did not really matter very much though it was thought rather surprising that the King had had to go to quite such lengths to demonstrate that he too was a loyal member of the United Arab Command. This was not, however, the feeling in the Israel Intelligence services or in the heart of General Narkiss (Commander

/ of the

of the Central front) who was expected to hold his long frontier against Jordan attacks with about two brigades. He was given some solace by the strengthening of his command with a little more armour and one extra weak brigade formation. Generally speaking, however, the hope still was that King Hussein, if he had to fight at all, would fight a sort of politico-military war and would do nothing really foolish. Looking back, it now seems rather surprising to me that in the welter of good advice and pressure to which the Israelis were subject, as far as I know, at no time did anyone think of speaking severely to King Hussein about the lunacy of his actions or warn him against attacking Israel seriously. It was left to the Israelis to make a last minute appeal to him, but by that time His Majesty was telling foreign Ambassadors that all he wanted was "to be left alone with the Israelis".

12. The major problem facing the Israel Government at this time, quite apart from the bitter pill of General Dayan, was how to maintain the necessary military readiness for what was obviously going to be a long haul, without damaging the economy of the country too badly. Committees were set up and sensible arrangements made to meet the situation. Politically the Government realised that they had again tied their hands, possibly even more firmly than before. Even General Dayan, quite honestly, in conversation with his brother-in-law and other Generals who were chafing at inaction, was expounding the doctrine that it would not pay Israel at all to infuriate the Tall Texan by acting on her own when He was dealing with Israel's interests. On Saturday the 3rd of June large numbers of troops were released and the beaches were as crowded as Blackpool in the holiday season. But on the Saturday night the Israel Military Intelligence was at it again. This time they were worried about reports of Iraqi reinforcements on their way to Jordan and Syria, the possibility of Jordanian troops being placed under Egyptian command and arrangements to fly two battalions of Egyptian commandos to Jordan. They had woken up to the fact that they were now probably facing a third casus belli which we had always feared - a Nasserite controlled Jordan. Like the other preceding events things had come about in a very un-clearcut way. The presumption had always been that the gallant little king might lose

/his

his throne and that a Government totally hostile to the West (and even more so to Israel) would be in command of the West Bank. It was suddenly appreciated that militarily this was what, in fact, had happened although the previous political outward trappings were still there. There was a further Cabinet on the Saturday night which was inconclusive. Fear of the Tall Texan still won the day. It was for the Intelligence services to try and demolish this last obstacle.

13. On Sunday the Cabinet met again and General Yariv, the Director of Military Intelligence, who has told me since that by this time he was the most unpopular man in Israel with the politicians, gave the performance of his life. He explained the great gravity of the new Jordanian threat which would be even worse after the Iraqi brigades arrived. He expounded the dangers of the overall Arab threat drawing extensively on intelligence he had about Egyptian thinking and planning, together with even more significant moves in the shape of tank concentrations. These looked as if Nasser might well be contemplating preempting Western efforts to get the Straits of Tiran opened by taking the port of Eilat and therefore rendering the whole question nugatory. He exposed that the diplomatic effort was getting nowhere. I understand Mr. Eban had some embarrassing moments in explaining quite how long the timetable was likely to be - apparently he was less than precise about this in the Cabinet of the 28th of May. Finally Yariv gave an analysis of every piece of information available to him indicating American thinking at all levels. He succeeded in persuading the Cabinet that President Johnson might well not be nearly as angry, if the Israelis took action, as the Israel Cabinet itself thought.

14. The inclusion of Messrs. Beigin, Dayan and Saphir in the Cabinet at this stage was really an irrelevance. Dayan could certainly have been relied on to have supported the military appreciation of the gravity of the threat and the military need to take some sort of action. Basically, however, he did not have to work very hard to convince his colleagues. The overriding military arguments were reinforced by an acceptance that the political disadvantages were perhaps not as grave as they had been thought to be.

/I assume

I assume also that the decision once taken, it was decided to implement it immediately, thereby regaining to a large extent the element of surprise and illustrating once again, if it needs to be done, the advantage of the short interior lines of communication of this country and the efficiency of the call up procedures which had now had almost three weeks running-in period. The soldiers on leave were almost invisibly whisked back to their units in the course of Sunday afternoon.

15. When the air raid sirens went at 8 o'clock on Monday morning there was nobody in Tel Aviv who did not think they were merely a practice. They went again about 40 minutes later with no All Clear in between, but this was because those responsible had not yet perfected how to differentiate between an Alert and an All Clear! Certainly nobody knew that the war had started and even the preliminary communiques indicated little more than a somewhat outsize-scale armoured clash to the south of Gaza. My first reactions, when I knew the war had started were to feel that quite apart from the brilliance of the military campaign, which I was sure would follow, an even greater feat had probably been in a deception plan unparallelled in history which had probably gone on for days.

16. Perhaps this is still the case and it would certainly be interesting to think so and to try and analyse the scope of this plan. But I do not believe it really. Things were much more simple than that. My American colleague and myself and the other diplomats in Israel are unfortunately not party to Israel Cabinet proceedings, but I am certain, along with my other colleagues, that as late as Saturday night there was no decision to go to war. What passed on Sunday we were not aware of until later. And what passed on Sunday was the convincing of the Israel Cabinet that Israel was faced with a situation incorporating no less than three elements each of which in previous days would have been considered a casus belli on its own. This was coupled with an appreciation that neither the Russians nor the Americans would move militarily and that the latter, who were much more of a deterrent to Israel action than the Russians, were unlikely, for a variety of reasons, to react too strongly. All that was left to be seen was the answer to the question the Army had

/been

been asking ever since they had become restricted by world diplomatic activities - "How long have we got? Can we at least have 48 hours?" It was to meet this question that the real deception plan was entered upon. Maybe here one can see the hand of Moshe Dayan. At any rate it succeeded, helped by the ineptness of Israel's adversaries in their response and Israel got more than twice its 48 hours. This is really a subject for inclusion in a further despatch on the actual military operations which I have the honour to be preparing parallel with this present effort.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Amman, Ankara, Bahrain, Beirut, Bonn, Jedda, Khartoum, Kuwait, Moscow, Nicosia, Paris, Rabat, Tehran, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington; to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations in New York, to H.M. Consul-General, Jerusalem; to the Commander, British Forces, Near East; and to the British Interests Section in Algiers.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(R. M. HADOW)

No. 1091/67

1076

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Tel Aviv presents his compliments to H.M. Rep., Rabat and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned documents.

British....Embassy.....
.....Tel Aviv.....
.....

..29..June....., 19..67

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure

Name and Date	Subject
Despatch No. 19 to the Foreign Office	The Second Arab/ Israel War, 1967.

See also despatch No 19 below.
These fascinating despatches lend considerable weight to the views I expressed on border - under - AHS 12.VII.67 G.S. Hussein in my recent policy letter to Sir P. Ogilvie Forbes. I fear that our D.A.D. attitude towards J-u-M is wrongly tinged with sentiment.
separate minute

To my mind a factor which contributes greatly to Arab defeat in the field is Arab propaganda itself. Whipped into enthusiasm & reckless fervour the Arabs can stand little chance against the "dispassionate and chivalrous action" of the Israelis in war. (Para 13) Attachment 15/7

12/VII

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BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.

Despatch No. 19

(1091/67)

29 June, 1967.

The Second Arab-Israel War, 1967
The Battle

S U M M A R Y

1. Who started the war? Almost certainly Israel. Her reasons. (Paragraphs 1 & 2)

2. Outbreak of hostilities. The air battle. (Para 3)

3. Advance into the Gaza Strip and Sinai. (Para. 4)

4. Campaign against Jordan. (Paras. 5-7)

5. The real deception plan and how Israel won time at the United Nations to complete the destruction of Nasser's forces. (Para. 8)

6. The campaign against Syria. (Para. 5)

7. Naval engagements. (Para. 10)

8. Almost unbelievable discrepancy between fighting abilities of Israelis and Arabs. (Para. 11)

9. The end of hostilities. Reactions in Israel. (Para. 12)

10. The Israelis made war. The Arabs thought it was a game according to rules which suited them. (Paras. 13-14).

11. Was this only the first round? (Para. 15)

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(1091/67)

DESPATCH NO. 19

BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEL AVIV.
29 June, 1967.

Sir,

The Second Arab-Israel War 1967

The Battle

In my despatch No. 18 of today's date I have described Israel's reactions to events starting with President Nasser's moves in Sinai and the Straits of Tiran which led to general hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours early on the 5th of June. I have the honour in this despatch to trace the course of the war as seen from Tel Aviv, in so far as this is possible on the still incomplete information available. In due course, when the fog of war has dispersed, and the Israel military authorities have revealed much more of the picture than they have so far been willing to show, I hope, with the help of my Service Attachés, to provide a detailed military analysis of the campaign.

2. We shall probably never know (and this is perhaps no longer an important question) which side started the fighting. I believed at the time and it is still my view that the Israelis got in the first blow, although there may be substance in their claims, which they say have since been confirmed from captured documents, that the Egyptians were on

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The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.

the point of launching a tank attack to cut off Bilat and an air strike against Israel's airfields. I have said in my parallel despatch that I am pretty certain that the decision to attack was taken on the 4th of June and was influenced by political as well as military factors. By then any hopes Israel may have had that action by the U.S.A. and Britain could defeat Nasser's blockade of the Straits of Tiran had disappeared. The closure of the Straits was in any case no longer the central problem for the Israelis who saw that the whole military balance in the area was daily swinging against them, threatening no less than the continued survival of their country. This danger was forceably brought home to them by the news of King Hussein's hurried visit to Cairo on the 30th of May to sign a joint Defence Pact with Egypt, and by reports of the movement of Iraqi troops and aircraft into Jordan. Either of these developments would, a few months ago, have been in itself a near casus belli. Israel, if she were to keep sufficient forces in the south to defeat the powerful Egyptian army in Sinai, which by then was estimated to be at a strength equivalent to seven divisions with upwards of 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, could not deploy more than a thin defensive screen along the Jordan border. A determined armoured thrust by the Jordanian Army, especially if reinforced by Iraqi brigades, could drive through to the sea at Israel's narrowest point in a matter of hours, cutting the country in two. This,

/coupled

coupled with their fear of a pre-emptive U.A.R. air strike against Israel's airfields and cities, must have seemed to the Israel Government an unacceptable risk. There could only be one answer - to strike first before the odds became too great.

3. The first official intimation of the commencement of hostilities was telephoned to my Defence Attaché by the Israel Military Liaison Officer at 8.35 a.m. local time on the 5th of June. The message simply said that fighting had broken out in Southern Israel early that morning between Egyptian air and armoured forces advancing towards Israel, and Israeli forces which had "advanced to stop them". I subsequently learned that the opening shots had been fired at about 7 a.m. At 7.45 a.m. the Israel Air Force made its first strikes against Egyptian airfields in Sinai, the Cairo/Canal complex and the Nile Valley. This operation was carried out with surgical precision. Within the first three hours every major airfield in Egypt capable of launching bombing raids against Israel had been put out of use, and the Egyptian Air Force had ceased to exist as an effective instrument of war. No Egyptian aircraft succeeded in penetrating Israel's air space, and no Egyptian bombs fell on Israel territory. Later in the day, airfields in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, from which sporadic attacks had been carried out against civilian targets in the narrow waist of Israel north of Tel Aviv, received the same treatment. There were

/no

no Arab air strikes on major I.A.F. airfields, but one transport plane was destroyed by a Jordanian Hunter attack on Kfar Sirkin, and Syrian aircraft three times attacked a disused airfield at Megiddo which had been disguised for decoy purposes to resemble the main Israel air base at Ramat David. By shortly after noon on the 5th of June the Israel Air Force had undisputed mastery of the air. Their score card by that time showed the destruction of 400 Arab aircraft (including 300 Egyptian) for the loss of only 19 of their own. Strikes by Israel aircraft on Arab airfields were made on subsequent days to keep them out of operation, but the greater part of the I.A.F. could now be used in support of ground operations.

4. On the ground, Israel forces attacked at the eastern end of the Gaza Strip breaking through to the coast at El Arish. Egyptian forces in the Gaza area were cut off and subsequently subdued. The Israelis fanned out from El Arish westwards along the coast and southwards towards Abu Ageila. Meanwhile two other Israel armoured columns broke into Sinai at Ketsiot and Quntileh.

5. Attacks commenced almost simultaneously from across the Jordan border, despite a last minute attempt by the Israel Government through General Odd Bull, the head of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, to persuade King Hussein to agree to a mutual arrangement of non-belligerency. The Israelis had no plans to attack Jordan, and their dispositions on the Jordan front were purely defensive and

/manned

manned entirely by reservists. From the middle of the morning of the 5th of June, Jordanian artillery shelled agricultural settlements inside the Israel border, and their long range guns bombarded the main centres of urban population in the coastal strip causing damage in or near Tel Aviv, Peta Tikva, Nathanya and Lod. In Jerusalem, indiscriminate fire was opened on the New City, and Jordanian troops seized Government House, the headquarters of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organisation, in an apparent attempt to enfilade into the Israel sector. These Jordanian attacks made little military sense, but they inflicted serious civilian damage and casualties, and could not have been better calculated to enrage the Israelis and force them to do battle.

6. At first only holding operations were possible in the Tulkarm and Kalkilya sectors with the weak Israel forces immediately available on that front. But one Israel brigade, possibly reinforced from Northern Command (Syrian front) launched a powerful attack from the north towards Jenin. In the Jerusalem corridor Latrun was captured and a push was made towards Ramallah. Later in the day, the Israel Air Force, having virtually eliminated the possibility of further intervention by Arab aircraft, was thrown into the battle with devastating effect. By the 6th of June Israel forces had taken Latrun and Jenin, and had silenced Jordanian artillery positions in the Tulkarm and Kalkilya areas which had kept up

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a steady bombardment for over 24 hours. After reinforcements, including tanks and paratroops had been brought up from the Negev, Jerusalem was surrounded by an Israel pincer movement along the heights, though Jordanian forces still held out in the Old City and continued to shell and mortar the Israel sector and such parts of Jordan Jerusalem as had fallen into Israel's hands.

7. By all accounts, individual soldiers and units of the Jordan Legion fought stubbornly and skilfully, but Jordanian generalship and the administrative handling of their forces was barely one whit more competent than that of the Egyptians. Without air cover, the Jordanian armour, some of which failed to reach the scene of action for lack of fuel, was at the mercy of the Israel Air Force. King Hussein had had his wish and found himself "alone with the Israelis". What he found was not to his taste and he embarked on a series of desperate appeals to the British and American Governments, through their Ambassadors in Amman, for help to bring the fighting to a speedy end. On your instructions, I twice made representations (as did my United States colleague) to the Israel Foreign Ministry for a cease-fire, but by then it was too late. Events were moving too fast. Having been provoked into a fight which they did not want, and had done their best to avoid, the Israelis were in no mood to listen to King Hussein's pleas that they should give him a chance to opt out. In any case, far from scaling down the fighting,

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the Jordanian troops on the ground were attacking even more strongly than before near Nablus and in the Old City. The Israelis were doubtful whether King Hussein was still in a position to control his own forces, or any longer in touch with the military situation (a point of view which seemed later to be confirmed by reports from H.M. Ambassador in Amman on the 7th of June that, unless the Israelis ceased their attacks, the Jordanians would counter attack with everything remaining to them, including "the use of aircraft"). The Israelis suggested that King Hussein should demonstrate his desire to end the fighting by dismissing his Egyptian Commander, but this he was either unable or unwilling to do. Jordanian resistance continued at Nablus and in the Old City of Jerusalem during the early part of the 7th of June, but was subdued later in the day. When the cease-fire took effect Israel forces were in occupation of the whole of the West Bank, and the surviving Jordanian forces had withdrawn eastwards across the Jordan River.

8. Meanwhile, in Sinai, the question was no longer whether the Israelis would win but whether they would be given enough time to complete the destruction of Nasser's armour, which was now streaming back in confusion on all routes westwards to the Suez Canal. On the 7th of June Egyptian tank forces were decimated by ground and air attacks in the areas of Bir Gafgafa and the Mitla Pass, and by the end of the day their escape routes to the Canal had been blocked by Israel forces which

/had

had got behind them. On the same day an Israel force landed from the sea, supported by paratroops who were landed on a nearby airfield, occupied Sharm-es-Sheikh without opposition, after its Egyptian garrison had withdrawn to avoid being cut off by the main Israel advance to the north. At the time the Israel military authorities disclosed very little information about these operations, neither to the public nor the press, nor, despite the strongest urging of my American colleague and myself, to our Service Attachés. There were sufficient local pointers to show that the battle was going Israel's way. The complete absence of activity by the Egyptian Air Force, for example, was in itself an indication of the extraordinary success achieved by Israel strikes against enemy airfields. But, helped by false or greatly inflated Arab propaganda claims, the true extent of Israel's successes was concealed from the outside world, enabling extra time to be bought at the United Nations. It was not until some 36 hours after the Security Council met to consider a cease-fire that the Russians and the Indians, acting on behalf of the Arabs, realised the danger to their friends and dropped their opposition to a simple cease-fire resolution. Even then the Egyptians continued to delay their acceptance of the cease-fire giving the Israel forces still further time in which to complete the tasks they had set themselves. When firing eventually ceased on the 8th of June, all that was left of the Egyptian forces was the smoking wreckage of

/their

their aircraft, armour and other impedimenta, and a pathetic rabble of disorganised troops, who had cast off their boots to hasten their flight, and were now painfully making their way back through the Israel lines to the doubtful sanctuary of the west bank of the Canal.

9. For all their martial bombast the Syrians had a healthy respect for Israel's military capabilities, especially in the air, and were much less eager than King Hussein to sacrifice themselves on the altar of Nasser's ambitions. The war was almost a day old before the Syrian army entered the lists. Apart from two infantry attacks, supported by tanks, on the 8th of June, which were easily driven off, activity soon confined itself to the traditional Syrian sport of shelling Israel settlements within range of the guns which overlooked the Hula Valley and all the border southwards to the Sea of Galilee. The Syrian bombardment was heavy and sustained. Much damage was caused to Israel kibbutzim, though civilian casualties were fortunately light owing to the use of well constructed shelters. Here the women, children and infants lived for five days without ever coming up. Continual attacks by the Israel Air Force reduced the shelling but had little effect on the Syrian gun positions which were deeply dug in and expertly camouflaged. They could not be attacked on the ground until sufficient Israel forces could be assembled to make this possible. By the evening of the 8th of June, the Israelis had brought up heavy reinforcements,

/released

released by the cessation of hostilities in Jordan and Sinai, and were ready to move in. But, inexplicably as it then seemed, the attack was held off. I have since learned on good authority that, despite strong pressure from the army, Israel Ministers including General Dayan, did their utmost to avoid an advance into Syria, believing that, as Damascus was the nerve centre of Russian influence in the Middle East, the consequences of prodding in that region could have been disastrous ~~consequences:~~ I believe too that the Americans, at the request of Mr. Eshkol, passed messages on the 8th of June to the U.S.S.R. to the effect that Israel had no intention of attacking if the Syrians would agree to an early cease-fire, and later told the Soviets that it was not the intention of Israel to attack Damascus. But the Syrians, believing perhaps that the Israel overtures were a sign of weakness, delayed their acceptance of the Security Council's call for a cease-fire, while continuing their damaging bombardment of Israel settlements. The Israel Government could no longer hold out against army and pressure from the northern kibbutzim. On the 9th of June Israel forces attacked simultaneously at a number of points in the north between Banias and Gadot, and in the south near Tel Katzir. After some heavy fighting against determined Syrian opposition, the Israel attacks were successful and the enemy's strong defensive positions astride the Roshpinna - Kuneitra road were enveloped by advances on the north and south. On the

/southern

southern sector of the front the Syrian's will to fight was broken by continual air attacks and Israel troops were air-lifted on to the high ground by helicopter. From then on their advance to the eventual cease-fire line proceeded rapidly at all points. By the 10th of June when a cease-fire took effect they had secured the whole of the Syrian escarpment forward of a line between Banias through Kuneitra and Darbashiya to El Hamma. Despite Syrian claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that they advanced further towards Damascus, though with the collapse of Syrian resistance it would have required little extra effort for them to have taken the capital within a matter of hours.

10. To round off this catalogue of unrelieved Arab defeats, it remains only to mention that the Egyptian Navy made little attempt to exploit its clear superiority over the puny naval forces of Israel. Its intervention in the war was limited to some ineffective shelling of positions in the Gaza area captured by Israel forces - an action which indirectly contributed to the tragic ~~air~~ attack made in error by Israel torpedo boats and planes of the Israel Air Force on an American survey ship which foolishly, and without notifying her presence, strayed too close to the Sinai coast. The Israel authorities have put out contradictory statements of attacks by their vessels at Alexandria and Port Said on the night of the 5th/6th of June, and claim to have damaged Egyptian submarines operating off Haifa. But nothing is

/known

known with certainty about these engagements, other than that the Egyptians hold prisoner six Israeli naval "frogmen".

11. The battle areas which my Service Attachés have so far visited show relatively little evidence of hard fighting, and they believe that the Israel military authorities may in some cases have exaggerated the strength of the enemy resistance. If so, this would be in line with the Israelis' policy of concealing the full extent of their successes in order to win time at the United Nations. It does not however detract from the superb performance of their forces which fully measures up to our own earlier military assessments of their morale, fighting ability and technical competance. These were not elite professional troops lavishly equipped with the most modern equipment, but for the most part civilian reservists, with comparatively limited training behind them, who were carried into battle in civilian transport, and were supplied and supported by essentially civilian services. By comparison, the professional Arab armies showed a total lack of appreciation of the essential elements of modern warfare, and an almost equal inability to use the sophisticated weapons and equipment provided by their Russian quartermasters. Their leadership on almost all fronts was inept to a degree which hardly seems possible after ten years of preparation and training for a war which was to bring about Israel's annihilation.

/12.

12. The end of the fighting on the 10th of June left Israel slightly numbed at the magnitude of her victory. There was no general expression of exultation and few outward signs of public jubilation such as marked V.E. Day in London. Success was accepted calmly, though with a realisation that Israel was now a power in her own right. Demobilised soldiers or those coming home on leave returned as unobtrusively as they had gone, to be welcomed back by their families in private reunions. The immediate mood was one of sadness for the dead. It should be noted that of the killed some 25 per cent were officers and another 15 per cent regular non-commissioned officers, thus illustrating the truth of the story that in the Israel Army the order to "Advance" is replaced by "Follow me". There was some quiet pride in the military valour of Jewish husbands, sons and brothers, coupled with relief that the civilian population had been spared the suffering and loss which they had expected, and were ready to take, from the Egyptian bombing and naval bombardment of their cities.

13. For those of us who were here throughout the period there was something very inspiring and yet rather terrifying about the orderly and almost imperceptible mobilisation of this citizen army; its rather dispassionate and clinical action in war; and the return of a large portion of it to civilian business-as-usual without fuss or heroics. Another impression is of the ability of the Army leaders for brilliant

/improvisation -

improvisation - even in Sinai much of the advance, often through areas thought impassable, was played off the cuff, and the whole campaign against Jordan was an improvisation from start to finish. If ever the importance of complete command of the air was illustrated this was a case. We should also not forget the tremendous advantage Israel enjoyed from interior lines of communication. Perhaps a remarkable illustration of this can be seen in the experience of one of the drivers of this Embassy who was in the transport section attached to a parachute unit. On Monday morning he was at Nitzana on the edge of Sinai, his truck loaded with barbed wire and camouflage netting. Some time in the afternoon, his unit, whose role was to attack Abu Ageila from the rear, was told that Abu Ageila was falling without their help. They about faced and by dawn on Tuesday morning were taking Latrun. In the afternoon he was in Ramallah and on Wednesday watched the mopping up operations on the outskirts of the Old City. By Thursday he was in Galilee and spent Friday waiting above the Bridge of the Daughters of Jacob. On Saturday he was half way to Kuneitra. On Monday he was back on leave and "Would you believe it," he said, "I never unloaded my truck all through this time".

14. Against this, with the exception of the Syrians who seem to have shown a certain amount of military realism throughout, the Jordanians and the Egyptians seemed to be living in a military Never-Never-Land. There was some

/element

element in their thinking that war was only a projection of cross-frontier fighting under the Armistice Agreements. Nasser wanted war but only on terms which made military nonsense. To King Hussein it was some sort of gallant and romantic game. The Ambassadors who were in disfavour on the 4th of June and whom he had told to leave him alone with the Israelis were being appealed to two days later to get the Israelis to stop the fighting. His most successful coup in the war was probably the promulgation of the "Big Lie". At one stroke British and American relations with numerous Arab countries were broken, Consulates and reading rooms were attacked and the flow of oil was stopped. Yet hardly was the war over when he was right back in form, suggesting that his shattered forces should be re-equipped by the West so that he could resist Soviet blandishments. For one side the whole thing was some kind of game controlled (unless they were winning) by rules laid down almost 20 years ago together with some they had thought up since. To the Israelis it was a cold blooded and unwanted surgical intervention. One can only be put in mind of the story of the Spanish Ambassador, who, after a particularly rough audience with Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I, haltingly proposed that Her Majesty might care for a game of chess. "Sirrah", she replied, "tell your master that the only game I play is the Bloody Game of War".

15. Once upon a time, wars stopped with the surrender of one party or another. Nowadays they stop because of cease fires and armistices imposed from outside. There is no peace treaty; the losers have not really lost and the winners have not really gained. Certainly, the problems for the winners seem more difficult than those for the losers. Already we hear that the Russians have supplied Nasser with 200 MIGs; that there is an airlift of arms and technicians to Cairo; that there have been military alerts and blackouts in Egypt and that, for mysterious reasons, Cairo airport was suddenly sealed off to all traffic for nine hours. The Israelis are watching this situation with some apprehension although it does not get much publicity in the Israel press. The appreciation must be that the Russians are only making a series of rather spectacular gestures to maintain the present Egyptian regime in power and that these gestures do not betoken any possibility of some quick <u>coup</u> by the Egyptians to try and win back some face in the Arab world. I only hope on behalf of the staff of this Embassy that this appreciation is right.

16. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of my despatch No. 18.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest respect,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

R. M. Hadow

H.E.

PWPP 1076

Al Alam (Istiqlal) No. 6246 of 29/6/1967.

Islamic States' responsibility. Editorial.

The stages of the major crime were achieved when the Jews officially announced Jerusalem's annexation to Israel. This is a fresh infringement of war laws, which Israel has always been doing ever since her creation to transgress against the Arab World. It had never been known in wars, ever since war laws were enacted, that a conqueror annexes to his country the land he acquired by force except when war meant acquisition more than victory to those who waged it. The whole world knows that the States which had waged war, such as Napoleon's France, Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy, never annexed the territory they occupied except when Mussolini foolishly occupied Albania.

How could Israel, then, commit such stupidity? By so doing she is realising the dreams of rabbis who had been promising Jews the occupation of the world. Under the influence of these criminal dreams the Israelis have now entered Jerusalem. They might realise still another dream by pulling down the Aqsa Mosque to rebuild Solomon's Temple on its ruins - which will be the height of criminology.

But in so doing they will unite all Moslems face their religious and historical responsibilities.

Jerusalem is not a property of Arabs alone. The Prophet who was carried in a trance to the site of the Aqsa Mosque is not the Prophet of Arabs alone but of all Moslems. If the Jews transgress against the Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Dome - and they have done so - their transgression will not be on Arab but on Moslem sanctuaries.

What will Moslems' attitude be towards this serious aggression on Islam? Six hundred million Moslems are scattered in the five continents and constitute important States as to population, production, armies and economic and political potentialities. These are now watching, like by-standers, this atrocious crime against the Moslem religion without raising a finger except an expression of diplomatic solidarity and verbal support for Arab states which are standing on the fire line. The experiment proved that the conspiracy is stronger than Arab power. In the circumstances does it behove Islamic States to leave Arabs to drink the bitter catastrophe to the very finish?

The Islamic world comprises States like Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Mali, Guinea, Somaliland, Senegal and other Afro-Asian countries whose religious and political duty is to do something positive to rescue Jerusalem alongside Arabs despite the serious relapse the latter have suffered. History will bear record of the fact that all Moslems allowed their main sanctuary to be tampered with by the Jews, to set up their Temples on its ruins and to realise their dreams.

We are confronting a disastrous danger; and it is not Islam-like for these States to look upon the question as a political or a racial controversy between Arabs and Jews. It is an intrinsic religious case, and that made Arabs sponsor it was their presence on the field of the battle by reason of their neighbourhood with Palestine which they encircle in all directions. God bears witness that Arabs have made tremendous sacrifice in this respect. Then why do other Moslem countries remain remote from the battle although it affects them in the very core of their religion?

Israel has taken the serious step which brings Islamic States face to face with their responsibilities - and it is for them to rise to the level of this responsibility.

H.E.

1076 Mupp

Al Hassan (Independent) No. 306 of June 22, 1967.

Editorial.

The tragedy of the Arab and Moslem world has been accentuated and the nation of the Koran was branded with shame and disgrace when the Zionist tyrannous forces raised a hand on Islamic sanctuaries and corrupt axes started to pull down parts of the Aqsa Mosque which Moslems had built next to the Church of the Resurrection where Caroug, the Khalifa of the Prophet, had refused to pray out of deference for freedom of worship and religions...

How could Moslems and Christians forget the place where Christ was born and where the Nativity Church was built? And will Moslems be forgetful of the the sanctuary about which it was said, "Praise be to God who carried his servant by night in a trance from the Mosque in Mecca to the Aqsa Mosque, which we blessed".

Protectors of Islam and its sanctuaries: remember that the combatant, Saladin Ayyoubi, recovered, with faith and great determination, Jerusalem after it had been occupied for 90 years by foreigners. At that time Moslem Arabs poured in from all parts of the world to recover the Holy Land after its long usurpation and after defiance of Moslem sentiments there...

Will Arabs and Moslems unify efforts and eject with enthusiasm and zeal the usurpers from the pure land, and liberate Moslem sanctuaries from the filth of enemies of Islam and of humanity?

Jerusalem and the Sakhra Mosque (Aqsa) are appealing for help. Will there be a response to the appeal for a Holy Jihad?

A.B.

H.E.

1076

Al Ahram (semi-official) p. 1090 of June 30, 1967.

Ikon C. 3.

A telegram of loyalty and allegiance to His Majesty from the University of Cairouiyeen Council.

Upon the conclusion of the recent meeting in Cairo of the Cairouiyeen University Council, Abdesalam el Tresei, Rector of the Latter University, sent the following telegram to the King:-

Upon the termination of its third session held in the Messonia Salith Pension on June 28 and 29, 1967, the Cairouiyeen University Council has the honour to renew to Your Majesty the expression of its loyalty and allegiance, and to acknowledge the marks of sympathy you manifest for the various scientific institutions.

The Council blesses Your Majesty's noble attitude towards the painful Arab last events which affect the very entity of the Arab and Islamic nation, and wishes you continued success, guidance, tremendous glory and support.

OS

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ALS 4.VII

RESTRICTED

(1076/67)

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

30 June, 1967.

It was reported in Al-Massa of 20 June that the Association of Moroccan Ulema had held an emergency meeting in Rabat to study the situation in the Middle East. Taking an extremist line foreshadowed in their message to the King on 5 June (not reported separately, but mentioned in the enclosure in the Ambassador's despatch No. 12 of 20 June), they issued an appeal to the Moslem World to "confront tyrannous colonialists and wicked assailants, and to sacrifice life and property to rescue Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa mosque from the grasp of the criminal Zionists". The appeal called for a boycott of the aggressors and for pressure to be brought to bear on their supporters and allies to abandon their arrogant support for Zionism, and called on all Moslem states to give active military support for the integrity of Islam. The Arab army was not beaten, but martyred by the colonialist fire and steel backing the Zionist state.

2. One passage of the appeal refers to the tolerance and pacifism of pure Islamic law, which however does not allow any laxity when religious shrines are in danger or when Moslem countries are attacked; instead it enjoins the necessity of a jihad, the holy war, to save Islam from its enemies. It even quotes a verse from the Koran in support: "Twenty of you armed with patience can vanquish two hundred."

3. This might be considered a definite interpretation of the duty of a Moslem at the present time, were it not for the fact that it conflicts in tone with the view expressed by the Commander of the Faithful, the King, in his address to the nation on 11 June. (Our telegrams Nos. 225 and 230 refer). In this he placed heavy emphasis on the sins of the Arabs and ascribed their defeat to divine punishment. "We have turned away from God and God has turned away from us", so Arabs must now mend their ways by, inter alia, showing solidarity with the victims of the aggression. His Majesty's view of the duties of the faithful at the moment is much more humble than that of the Ulema and perhaps more realistic!

/What.....

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

RESTRICTED

4. What is potentially serious about this is that subversive elements opposed to the King and his policies can now claim high religious authority on their side and ignore any qualms of conscience they might have had about attacking the position of the Commander of the Faithful.

(A. L. Southorn)

SERVICE TELEX ◇ SERVICE TELEX

PRODROME RABAT
01 OP RABAT
PRODROME RABAT
CENTROFORM LDN

1076

8/7 as AWS 4.VII

CIRCULAR RETRACT 89930

ASKED ABOUT A REPORT THAT IRAQI CADETS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO LEAVE BRITAIN, SPOKESMAN AT TODAY'S FOREIGN OFFICE NEWS CONFERENCE SAID: ''THIS WOULD BE A MATTER MOSTLY FOR THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. AS YOU KNOW THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT BROKE OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US AND OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL ATTACHED TO THE EMBASSY NATURALLY LEFT WITH THE REST OF OUR PEOPLE. PRESUMABLY IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS FELT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR IRAQI MILITARY CADETS TO BE HERE. OF COURSE, WE ARE HOPING THAT OUR RELATIONS WILL BE RESTORED TO NORMAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND I AM QUITE SURE THEY WILL BE WELCOMED BACK WHEN THAT SITUATION IS ARRIVED AT''.

LPS DEFENCE CORRESPONDENT WRITES:

THERE ARE SEVENTEEN IRAQIS AT ARMY SCHOOLS AND THREE AT RAF SCHOOLS IN BRITAIN. THEY HAVE BEEN ASKED TO LEAVE BRITAIN WITHIN VSEVEN DAYS FROM MONDAY, JUNE 26. THEIR DEPARTURE IS BEING ARRANGED BY THE PAKISTAN HIGH COMMISSIONER.

THE SEVEN DAYS IS IN NO SENSE A TIME LIMIT BUT IS CONSIDERED TO BE A REASONABLE TIME FOR THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE MADE. THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ANY FORCIBLE EXPULSION AND BRITAIN WOULD BE PLEASED TO WELCOME BACK THESE STUDENTS WHEN THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IS HAPPIER. THE IRAQI STUDENTS WILL REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT ACCOMMODATION UNTIL THEY LEAVE.

CENTROFORM

PRODROME RABAT

Enclose. 1076

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CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

GUIDANCE NO. 166 30 JUNE 1967 (IPG)

CONFIDENTIAL

OIL PRICES.

VERBATIM NO. 304/67.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN TANKER RATES (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 2 OF GUIDANCE NO. 162), THE NECESSITY TO DRAW ON SUPPLIES OF MORE EXPENSIVE OIL FROM THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE (PRINCIPALLY TO REDUCE TANKER HAULS) HAS INCREASED THE COST OF SUPPLYING THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE REST OF WESTERN EUROPE. THE INCREASE IN PRICES NOW APPROVED BY H.M.G. IS BROADLY IN LINE WITH INCREASES ALREADY MADE IN OTHER WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

2. IF IT SUGGESTED THAT, AS THE ARAB STATES HAVE BANNED EXPORTS TO THE U.K. AND U.S. ONLY, OTHER CONSUMING COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT HAVE TO BEAR PRICE INCREASES YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE PRESENT DIFFICULTIES (WHICH AFFECT ALL CONSUMING COUNTRIES) DO NOT STEM FROM THIS BAN BUT PRIMARILY FROM CLOSURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND PIPELINES. THE COMMON PROBLEM IS BASICALLY A TANKER SHORTAGE RATHER THAN A SHORTAGE OF TOTAL OIL AVAILABILITY.

SOSFA/CROSEC SENT 1615Z 30 JUNE 1967

BY TELEGRAPH: COPENHAGEN
THE HAGUE
OSLO
STOCKHOLM
U.K. MISSION NEW YORK
B.I.S. NEW YORK
WASHINGTON
OTTAWA
CANBERRA
NEW DELHI
RAWALPINDI
LAGOS
BAHRAIN
BEIRUT
JEDDA
KUWAIT

[PRIORITY]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION
J.I.P.G.D.

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY 11 JUL 1967

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag

CYPHER/OTP

[Distribution Heading]

FROM FCO. TO RABAT

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 167 D M

[Date] 30 JUNE R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

RESTRICTED.

SOVIET/U.A.R. RELATIONS.

FRIDAY ARTICLE BY HEIKAL, EDITOR OF CAIRO

NEWSPAPER ~~QUOTE~~ "AL AHRAM" ~~UNQUOTE~~. WHICH INDULGES

IN SOME SELF CRITICISM OF EGYPTIAN FAILURES AS

REGARDS PRESENTATION AND TOO EXTREME LANGUAGE.

SEEKS TO PRESENT CURRENT U.A.R. POLICIES AS

MODERATE AND BENT ON CULTIVATING WIDE

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT.

DISTRIBUTION

2. IT IS INTERESTING TO COMPARE THIS EGYPTIAN

ATTEMPT TO APPEAR AS CLIMBING BACK ON TO THE

NON-ALIGNED BANK. WITH THE REPORT IN TO-DAY~S

TIMES FROM MOSCOW OF AN ARTICLE IN THE SOVIET

WEEKLY ~~QUOTE~~ "ABROAD" ~~UNQUOTE~~. THIS SUGGESTS A

CLEAR SOVIET INTENTION ~~QUOTE~~ "NOW THAT EGYPT IS

MORE DEPENDENT THAN EVER ON SOVIET DIPLOMATIC.

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

/multary

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

ILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT" ~~(UNQUOTE)~~ TO PRESS

OR ~~(QUOTE)~~ "BASIC POLITICAL CHANGES" ~~(UNQUOTE)~~ AND

~~QUOTE~~ 'A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MACHINERY OF

GOVERNMENT TO BECOME ARAB SOCIALIST ~~(UNQUOTE)~~.

(C.F. F O GUIDANCE NUMBER 151 PARAGRAPH 3).

SOSFA

1076

INWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair
Code Code R
Cypher
(Paraphrase Heading)
Cypher/OTP
En Clair by Conf. Bag: G/CATA"

[Distribution Heading]

FROM F.O. TO RABAT.

[Signature]

[No. and prefix] No. GUIDANCE 168 D M

[Date] 30 JUNE 1967. R M

Repeated to

[Priority] PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS GUIDANCE 168 OF

30 JUNE.

ARAB/ISRAEL.

THE ARABS~ RELUCTANCE TO DISBELIEVE ALL VERSIONS OF THE BIG LIE SPRINGS IN PART FROM A NEED TO BELIEVE THAT THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT HAVE DEFEATED THEM SO THOROUGHLY WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE.

2. THIS NEED MIGHT BE TO SOME EXTENT SATISFIED BY DIRECTING THEIR ATTENTION DISCREETLY TO THE DEGREE OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE, WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY EQUIPPED WITH FRENCH AIRCRAFT.

3. IN FACT THE SIZE OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE IS SURPRISINGLY SMALL, AND THE DECISIVE FACTOR FOR ITS VICTORY WAS ITS GREAT EFFICIENCY: IT IS ESTIMATED FOR EXAMPLE THAT PILOTS FLEW UP TO 10 SORTIES/

DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:—

389.Wt.37518/D161.1000.11/63.C.P.L.Gp.626.

SORTIES A DAY. WHICH WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE IMPRESSION OF ~~QUOTE~~ "WAVE UPON WAVE" ~~UNQUOTE~~ OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT WHICH APPARENTLY LED KING HUSSEIN TO ASSUME OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

4. NEVERTHELESS IT IS TRUE THAT 50% OF THE OPERATIONAL ISRAELI AIRCRAFT WERE THE LATEST MIRAGE 3C AND MYSTERE 4A WITH WHICH THE UAR AIR FORCE WAS PARTIALLY EQUIPPED. ALSO IT APPEARS THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD DEVELOPED, ON THE BASIS OF A FRENCH INVENTION, A NEW BOMB INCORPORATING AN EXTRA PROPELLING CHARGE WHICH DRIVES IT DEEP INTO THE GROUND BEFORE EXPLODING AND THEREBY MAKES IT ESPECIALLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST RUNWAYS.

WHICH ARE AT LEAST AS EFFECTIVE AS THE RUSSIAN MIG 21S

5. ~~//~~EXPRESS OF 19-23 JUNE HAS AN INTERESTING PIECE OF WHICH COPIES ARE BEING SENT TO YOU BY BAG ABOUT FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE.

6. YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO USE THESE POINTS OBJECTIVELY AND TO AVOID ANY IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE FRENCH POLICY. THE ISRAELI ARMY WAS AFTER ALL LARGELY EQUIPPED WITH BRITISH CENTURION TANKS. BUT IT WAS THE AIR BATTLE WHICH WAS DECISIVE.

SOSFA

UNCLASSIFIED

BRITISH EMBASSY,
RABAT.

30 June, 1967.

While the Arab world is still seething with voices clamouring for the continuation of the holy war, jihad, against Zionism, racialism and imperialism, cries which are faithfully echoed in the opposition press in Morocco, the semi-official government mouthpiece Al-Anbaa published on 25 June an editorial which called for a very different kind of jihad.

2. The article stated that no events must be allowed to deflect Morocco from the path laid down by the King or to make Moroccans forget their real battle - the construction, strengthening and development of their country. "No battle, no passing event.....however noisy and violent, should deflect us from our path.....and we must pursue our great jihad fiercely, courageously and lucidly until victory.....".

3. This is probably as unequivocal a statement as we shall ever get that life must go on, that (as far as official policy is concerned) the situation is back to normal and that it is "business as usual". (I should perhaps report for the record that the Nasserite Al-Massa has already attacked the government's attitude, saying that while the Arab nation awaits the call to arms, "our government is silent and our ministers shamelessly present us with sports projects and appoint new experts").

4. I am sending copies of this letter to Roberts in the Ministry of Overseas Development, C.R.E.D., Board of Trade and E.C.G.D.

(A. L. Southorn)

R. H. Baker, Esq.,
North and East African Department,
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

UNCLASSIFIED

Rabat

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE MOROCCAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 5.00 P.M. ON 23 JUNE, 1967

Present

The Rt. Hon. George Brown, M.P.

Lord Caradon

Mr. T.F. Brenchley

Mr. D.J.D. Maitland

Mr. D.G. CRAWFORD

M. Ballafrej

M. Benhima

M. Ballafrej welcomed Mr. Brown's statement in the Assembly and commented that its references to the Holy places had created a profound impression. If the Israeli occupation were condoned it would mean that the rule of force had taken over again instead of respect for international law which the United Nations embodies. Morocco shared the view of all Arab countries, that Arabs should not be dispossessed in Palestine and because of her normal good relations with the United States and the United Kingdom, the present situation was painful. He hoped to see the United Kingdom play a conciliatory role.

2. Mr. Brown considered that it would be best to concentrate on the practical measures which could now be taken to relieve the present situation. The question of an Israeli withdrawal was tied up with what the Arabs might give in return, possibly recognition of Israel or non-belligerence. This was not however, the time to ask an Arab state to

give either, and thus it was unrealistic to hope that these major matters could be dealt with at the present time. It was not [redacted], necessary to accept the Israel occupation of Arab land as following the recent war as a fait accompli. It would need to be re-arranged at the appropriate moment but not now, when the Arabs were hurt and humiliated.

3. Replying to a comment from M. Balafrej that this was the ~~Morrocan~~ American view, Mr. Brown said that he went further than the ~~Americans~~, particularly on Jerusalem ~~as~~. Moreover he believed that important problems such as the refugees could now be tackled. Mr. Brown suggested that Morocco should now be considering the future of the Arab world, particularly since nobody could tell whether Arab leadership would stay in Cairo.

4. M. Balafrej though that leadership in the Arab world should be with those countries who were strong and developed and who regarded the real problem of the Arab countries as their fight to conquer under development. Nevertheless, the King could not afford to refuse to show solidarity with other Arab countries over Palestine. He agreed that there was a need to wait for Arab passions to subside but at the same time, for this to occur, some gesture towards the Arabs was required.

/ 5. Mr. Brown

5. Mr. Brown paid tribute to the courage and wisdom which the King had shown during the crisis despite many difficulties he and faced in Morocco. The whole situation might have changed if he had not so acted, and Mr. Bellafrej pointed out that Morocco had been obliged to take steps to protect one hundred thousand Jewish citizens.

6. Mr. Bellafrej said that he was glad to see we were not abandoning King Hussain of Jordan who now had to deal with a most difficult internal situation. Mr. Brown, while he thought that King Hussein had been shown sufficient wisdom, confirmed that the United Kingdom would not desert the Hashemite family. We would not however, make things worse for King Hussain by being over friendly to him.

CONFIDENTIAL

H.M. Ambassador,

RABAT.

With the compliments of

THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1

27th June, 1967.

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE MOROCCAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, AT 5.00 P.M. ON 23 JUNE, 1967.

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1076.

Presse arabe

"Al-Alam" (Istiqlal) -- 30 juin 1967

(5 colonnes en 1ère page)

Les Juifs font sauter le quartier des Maghrébins à Jérusalem pour élargir le passage qui conduit au Mur des lamentations

3 000 enfants du Maghreb arabe connaissent un sort terrible

Les Juifs s'emparent des biens habous maghrébins en Palestine

"Al-Alam" a appris que les Juifs ont fait sauter le quartier des Maghrébins à Jérusalem. Ce quartier, qui va de "Bab Silssila" au Mur des lamentations, est considéré comme faisant partie du territoire sacré. Il abritait 3 000 familles du Maghreb arabe qui vivaient dans des édifices habous appartenant aux pays du Maghreb. Les Juifs ont donc démoli tout le quartier et l'ont totalement rasé après avoir donné aux habitants un délai de trois heures pour évacuer les lieux, sous peine d'être ensevelis sous les décombres. Ce quartier se trouve à proximité de la GrandeMosquée. Les Juifs l'ont détruit pour élargir la voie qui conduit au Mur des lamentations pour que leurs rabbins n'aient pas à passer par des ruelles étroites.

Le quartier des Maghrébins a été constitué en habous à l'époque d'Abou Mediène El-Rout. Il comprend une vaste étendue de terres fertiles sises en territoire palestinien. Les Juifs se sont emparés d'une grandepartie de ces terres quand ils occupèrent la moitié de la Palestine, lors de leur première agression. Il viennent de prendre le reste en occupant la rive occidentale du Jourdain .

Quant au sort des citoyens maghrébins de ce quartier, nul ne le connaît. Mais la violence et la sauvagerie israéliennes dont sont victimes les Arabes risquent d'inciter les Juifs à exterminer les citoyens maghrébins en raison de leur qualité d'Arabes .

Comme exemple des actes de sauvagerie auxquels se sont livrés les Israéliens contre les édifices arabes, nous avons appris qu'ils ont détruit les habitations des villes de Khan-Younès et Jebaliya dans la zone de Gaza et qu'ils en ont expulsé les habitants. Sur la rive ouest du Jourdain, ils ont fait sauter de nombreuses localités, Qalqiliya, Amouas, Beit-Nouya et Yalbou, alors que les habitants n'avaient pas encore évacué les lieux. Selon les informations, les Juifs se seraient emparés de toutes les voitures des habitants de la rive ouest, y compris les véhiculesde transport (camions et cars), et auraient pillé tous les produits alimentaires qui se trouvaient dans les magasins.

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AFS 13·VII

His Excellency,

Mr. L.G.Holliday, C.M.G.,

Rabat.

With the compliments of

FOREIGN OFFICE

NORTH AND EAST AFRICAN DEPARTMENT

(R. H. BAKER)

LONDON, S.W.1.

30 June, 1967.